All checks were successful
Build and deploy / Validate source (push) Successful in 7s
Build and deploy / Integration suite on a real stack (push) Successful in 1m25s
Build and deploy / Secret scan and release gate (push) Successful in 5s
Build and deploy / Publish images and notify Portainer (push) Successful in 1m31s
local/ held six unrelated things under a name that stopped being true once it
became the production runtime: the service, the frontend, the tests, the ops
commands, the container definitions and the dependency lock, 65 files with
nothing to tell them apart.
app/ the service: api/ routers, core/ for identity, database, models,
prices and secret loading, and the worker, bootstrap and schema
tests/ the twelve suites, no longer inside the shipped package
ops/ backup, readiness, dependency audit, security summary
infra/ Dockerfiles, gateway templates, ClamAV and storage configuration,
the requirements and their hash lock
web/ the Site, Kanban and portal pages with their scripts
deploy/Dockerfile.api now copies app/ alone, so the tests stop shipping to
production; the local image still carries them, because the suites run inside
the stack's network.
Five kinds of reference had to follow, and each was found by something different
rather than by reading. Imports of the form "from . import db" survived a rewrite
that only matched "from .db import". Tests kept relative imports of modules that
had left the package. A mock.patch target names its module in a string, where no
import rewriting can see it. The browser test resolves a fixture by path. And the
release gate's markers pointed at local/runtime.py and local/worker.py, which is
the decay its new marker test exists to catch — it caught it.
Verified from docker compose down -v: the stack starts, all six integration
suites, both browser suites and the twenty-nine unit tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
112 lines
5.1 KiB
Python
112 lines
5.1 KiB
Python
"""Local customer passwords and revocable database sessions. No email service."""
|
|
import hashlib
|
|
import os
|
|
import secrets
|
|
import logging
|
|
import json
|
|
from uuid import UUID, uuid4
|
|
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
|
|
from ..core.db import connect
|
|
|
|
COOKIE_SECURE = os.environ.get('COOKIE_SECURE', 'false').lower() == 'true'
|
|
|
|
def client_ip(request: Request):
|
|
"""The requester's address, for rate-limit buckets and security events.
|
|
|
|
The API is only reachable through the web gateway, which replaces
|
|
X-Forwarded-For with the peer address it observed, so the header carries
|
|
exactly one value the client could not choose. Without this every request
|
|
looks like the gateway, which collapses per-source limits into one global
|
|
bucket and strips the address from the audit trail.
|
|
"""
|
|
forwarded = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-for', '').split(',')[0].strip()
|
|
if forwarded:
|
|
return forwarded[:64]
|
|
return request.client.host if request.client else 'unknown'
|
|
|
|
def password_hash(password, salt=None):
|
|
salt = salt or secrets.token_hex(16)
|
|
digest = hashlib.scrypt(password.encode(), salt=bytes.fromhex(salt), n=16384, r=8, p=5).hex()
|
|
return f'scrypt-v2${salt}${digest}'
|
|
|
|
def password_matches(password, stored):
|
|
try:
|
|
version, salt, digest = stored.split('$')
|
|
if version not in ('scrypt', 'scrypt-v2'): return False
|
|
actual = hashlib.scrypt(password.encode(), salt=bytes.fromhex(salt), n=16384, r=8,
|
|
p=1 if version == 'scrypt' else 5).hex()
|
|
return secrets.compare_digest(actual, digest)
|
|
except (ValueError, TypeError):
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH = password_hash('invalid-account-password', '00'*16)
|
|
|
|
def session_row(request):
|
|
try:
|
|
sid = UUID(request.cookies.get('dtf_session', ''))
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
raise HTTPException(401, 'Start a local session first')
|
|
with connect() as c:
|
|
row = c.execute('SELECT * FROM dtf_local.sessions WHERE id=%s AND expires_at>now()', (sid,)).fetchone()
|
|
if not row:
|
|
raise HTTPException(401, 'Session expired; sign in or start a new session')
|
|
return row
|
|
|
|
def owner(request: Request):
|
|
return session_row(request)['owner']
|
|
|
|
def new_session(c, response, identity=None):
|
|
sid = uuid4()
|
|
identity = identity or uuid4()
|
|
c.execute('INSERT INTO dtf_local.sessions(id,owner) VALUES(%s,%s)', (sid,identity))
|
|
response.set_cookie('dtf_session', str(sid), httponly=True, secure=COOKIE_SECURE,
|
|
samesite='strict', max_age=86400*7)
|
|
return identity
|
|
|
|
def transfer_guest(c, previous, identity):
|
|
# Successful authentication can claim only the current guest browser's records.
|
|
if c.execute('SELECT id FROM dtf_local.accounts WHERE id=%s', (previous['owner'],)).fetchone():
|
|
return
|
|
for table in ('uploads','quotes','orders'):
|
|
c.execute(f'UPDATE dtf_local.{table} SET owner=%s WHERE owner=%s', (identity,previous['owner']))
|
|
c.execute('DELETE FROM dtf_local.sessions WHERE owner=%s', (previous['owner'],))
|
|
|
|
def audit(event, **fields):
|
|
# Only explicit metadata: never cookies, passwords, signed URLs or request bodies.
|
|
logging.getLogger('dtf.security').warning(json.dumps({'event':event, **fields}, sort_keys=True))
|
|
try:
|
|
from psycopg.types.json import Jsonb
|
|
with connect() as c:
|
|
c.execute('INSERT INTO dtf_local.security_events(event,details) VALUES(%s,%s)',(event,Jsonb(fields)))
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
# Logging must still work during a DB outage without recursively auditing itself.
|
|
logging.getLogger('dtf.security').error('Security event persistence unavailable')
|
|
|
|
def rate_limit(scope, identity, limit, seconds=900):
|
|
key = hashlib.sha256((scope+'|'+identity).encode()).hexdigest()
|
|
with connect() as c:
|
|
row = c.execute("""INSERT INTO dtf_local.login_attempts(key,attempts) VALUES(%s,1)
|
|
ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET
|
|
attempts=CASE WHEN dtf_local.login_attempts.started_at < now()-%s*interval '1 second' THEN 1 ELSE LEAST(dtf_local.login_attempts.attempts+1,1000000) END,
|
|
started_at=CASE WHEN dtf_local.login_attempts.started_at < now()-%s*interval '1 second' THEN now() ELSE dtf_local.login_attempts.started_at END
|
|
RETURNING attempts""", (key,seconds,seconds)).fetchone()
|
|
if row['attempts'] > limit:
|
|
audit('rate_limit', scope=scope)
|
|
raise HTTPException(429, 'Too many requests. Try again later.', headers={'Retry-After':str(seconds)})
|
|
|
|
def throttle(email, request):
|
|
# Independent account and source buckets prevent bypass by rotating emails.
|
|
rate_limit('auth-source', client_ip(request), 60)
|
|
rate_limit('auth-account', email, 10)
|
|
|
|
def operator(request: Request):
|
|
token = request.cookies.get('dtf_operator', '')
|
|
if not token or len(token)>128:
|
|
raise HTTPException(401, 'Sign in to the local Kanban')
|
|
digest = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
|
|
with connect() as c:
|
|
row = c.execute('SELECT username FROM dtf_local.operator_sessions WHERE token_hash=%s AND expires_at>now()', (digest,)).fetchone()
|
|
if not row:
|
|
raise HTTPException(401, 'Operator session expired')
|
|
return row['username']
|