e95a42dbed
PORTAINER.md called deploy/stack.yaml the production stack. The deployed file is docker-compose.yml, which supplies eight credentials as plain environment variables where stack.yaml uses Docker secrets. That puts the database password, operator password and the R2 secret key in the container environment, readable through docker inspect and the Portainer stack editor. Recorded as ROADMAP 2.12 with the three options rather than changed here: altering how production receives credentials is not a quiet change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
157 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
157 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
# Portainer deployment
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DTF follows the same operating model as Graphs and ComporHUB: Gitea builds
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prebuilt images, pushes them to the Gitea registry, and calls one Portainer
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webhook. Portainer owns and redeploys one Docker Swarm stack named `dtf-cloud`.
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The deployed stack is the repository's `docker-compose.yml`, which the
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`dtf-cloud` Portainer stack points at. `deploy/stack.yaml` is a more hardened
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definition that supplies every credential as a Docker secret rather than an
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environment variable; it is not currently deployed. See `ROADMAP.md` 2.12 before
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assuming either is authoritative.
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`deploy/stack.yaml` contains Site, Kanban, API,
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worker, PostgreSQL, ClamAV, and a one-time database initializer. Production uses
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Cloudflare R2, so MinIO is not part of this stack.
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## 1. Gitea configuration
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The single workflow is `.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml`. Every push and pull request
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runs static validation, the integration suite against a real stack, and a secret
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scan. A push to `main` then builds the production images, publishes both `latest`
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and the full commit SHA, reports their vulnerabilities, and calls Portainer.
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What actually gates a deployment:
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| Check | Gates? |
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| `py_compile` and the unit tests | yes |
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| Integration suite on a live stack (smoke, workflow, security, scanning, retention, runtime) | yes |
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| Browser suites | only when the runner has Chrome; otherwise warns and continues |
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| Trivy secret scan (HIGH/CRITICAL) | yes |
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| Source preflight (`deploy/production_preflight.py --source-only`) | only when `ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT` is `true` |
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| Trivy image vulnerabilities, CRITICAL | yes |
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| Trivy image vulnerabilities, HIGH | no — reported after the build |
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The source preflight is advisory by default because it refuses a release while
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the payment and messaging adapters are fake, which is the deliberate state the
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stack runs in today. Enforcing it now would block every deployment. Set the
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repository variable `ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT` to `true` once real adapters
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land, and it becomes a hard gate.
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CRITICAL image findings block. Both images carry none: the bases are pinned by
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digest, both Dockerfiles upgrade their OS packages, and the web image moved off
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the 1.28 nginx line, which pins `nginx=1.28.3-r1` in `/etc/apk/world` and so
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cannot be patched in place. HIGH findings are reported rather than enforced
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because the remainder have no upstream fix.
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`PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE` and `NGINX_BASE_IMAGE` override the digests pinned in the
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Dockerfiles. Update the Dockerfile default in the same change, so the repository
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still records what a build used.
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Repository variables:
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- `REGISTRY_HOST` — normally `gitea.blyzer.com.br`.
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- `REGISTRY_OWNER` — normally `blyzer`.
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- `PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE`, `NGINX_BASE_IMAGE`, `TRIVY_IMAGE` — approved immutable
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`@sha256:` image references.
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Repository secrets:
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- `REGISTRY_USERNAME` and `REGISTRY_TOKEN` — package write credentials.
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- `PORTAINER_WEBHOOK` — webhook generated by the `dtf-cloud` Portainer stack.
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The webhook is called only after the gating checks in the table above pass.
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`ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT` and `TRIVY_IMAGE` are optional repository
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variables; without them the preflight is advisory and a pinned default scanner
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image is used.
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## 2. One-time Portainer resources
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Use a Docker Swarm environment. Create a dedicated production PostgreSQL volume
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and set its name as `POSTGRES_VOLUME`. Label its Swarm node
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`dtf_database=true`. Do not reuse the localhost Compose volume.
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Create each application credential under **Secrets**. Use versioned names such
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as `dtf_prod_database_url_v1`, then place only those names in the corresponding
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`*_SECRET` stack variables. The stack expects distinct secrets for:
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- runtime and administrator database URLs;
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- database administrator and application-role passwords;
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- R2 access key and secret key;
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- operator password;
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- Mercado Pago token and webhook secret;
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- Tiny/Olist token;
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- WhatsApp token.
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Credential values must never be entered into Git, `portainer.env`, or Gitea
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workflow variables.
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## 3. Create the stack once
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In Portainer select **Stacks → Add stack → Git repository**:
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- Name: `dtf-cloud`
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- Repository: this Gitea repository
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- Reference: `main`
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- Compose path: `deploy/stack.yaml`
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- Registry: the private `gitea.blyzer.com.br` registry
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- Re-pull image: enabled
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- Automatic update: webhook
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Load a completed copy of `deploy/portainer.env.example` as the stack's
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non-secret environment variables. Do not load the example unchanged: `TBD` and
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zero digests are deliberate blockers. Keep `IMAGE_TAG=latest` for normal
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webhook deployments.
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Before entering those values in Portainer, validate the completed ignored file:
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```bash
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set -a
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. deploy/portainer.env
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set +a
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python3 deploy/production_preflight.py
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```
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The public reverse proxy should send the Site hostname to `SITE_PORT` and the
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Kanban hostname to `KANBAN_PORT`. `/api/` and `/portal.html` are served through
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the Site gateway. Preserve the original Host header. Do not expose PostgreSQL,
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API, worker, or ClamAV. Restrict the
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two published web ports at the host firewall so only the reverse proxy can use
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them, and terminate HTTPS at the proxy.
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The `db-init` service completing and stopping is expected. The other six
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services must be healthy. A failed `db-init` task or an unhealthy service blocks
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acceptance.
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## 4. Normal deployment
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Push to `main`. Gitea validates, tests, scans, publishes these images, and calls
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the webhook:
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```text
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gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-api:latest
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gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-api:<full-commit-sha>
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gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-web:latest
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gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-web:<full-commit-sha>
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```
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In Portainer, verify the new image digests, service health, `db-init` result, and
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the public `/health` endpoints. Back up PostgreSQL and R2 before changes that
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affect stored data or retention.
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## 5. Rollback
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In the Portainer stack variables, change `IMAGE_TAG` from `latest` to the full
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SHA of the last known-good Gitea commit and redeploy. This rolls back Site, API,
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Kanban, and worker code; it does not undo database migrations or restore data.
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After recovery and a corrected release, return `IMAGE_TAG` to `latest`.
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## Current blocker
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This is the final deployment shape, but it is not authorized for production
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today. Production adapters, Docker-secret file loading, provider sandbox tests,
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current clean base images, approved inputs, and a production restore rehearsal
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are still required. Do not bypass `deploy/production_preflight.py` or the Gitea
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scan gates to make a deployment run.
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