docs: record the release gates and what they do not cover

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

ROADMAP.md

@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@
 > Update the **Current step** line and the item status every time something moves.
 > Add new findings at the bottom of the relevant block rather than rewriting history.
 
-**Current step:** Block 0 closed, plus 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5 and 5.1. Next: 2.4 (the
-release gate the docs describe but the workflow never ran — partly addressed by
-5.1), then 2.6/2.7. Block 1 still waits on client inputs for 1.1/1.2.
+**Current step:** Block 0 closed, plus 2.1–2.5 and 5.1. Next: 2.6 (pin base image
+digests and triage the fixable image findings, which is what would let the image
+scan gate), then 2.7–2.11. Block 1 still waits on client inputs for 1.1/1.2.
 
 **Last audit:** 2026-09-18, full read of `local/`, `dtf-site.html`, `deploy/`,
 `.gitea/`, docs and legacy prototypes. Findings below carry their audit IDs.
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ It passes `DATABASE_URL_FILE`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID_FILE`, `OPERATOR_PASSWORD_FILE
 - **Accept:** the stack renders and boots against Swarm secrets; missing operator
   config yields 503, not 500.
 
-### `[ ]` 2.4 — The documented release gate does not exist `(F8)`
+### `[x]` 2.4 — The documented release gate does not exist `(F8)`
 
 `PORTAINER.md` and `SECURITY_REPORT.md` claim the workflow runs the full isolated
 suite, Trivy HIGH/CRITICAL image gates, secret scanning and the source preflight
@@ -429,6 +429,18 @@ charges. Fix as part of 1.1.
   blockers stay, so the gate still refuses a release while the payment and
   messaging adapters are fake.
 
+- `[x]` 2.4 — A blocking Trivy secret scan was added and verified both ways: a
+  planted AWS key pair, GitHub token and private key block the job; the repository
+  passes clean. Worth knowing: Trivy allowlists documented example credentials, so
+  my first probe passed with AWS's own sample keys — the gate is a backstop, not
+  permission to commit secrets. The source preflight now runs and always prints its
+  verdict, enforcing only when `ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT` is `true`; enforcing
+  it today would block every deploy, since it refuses a release while the adapters
+  are fake. Image vulnerabilities are reported after each build, not enforced —
+  56 HIGH and 3 CRITICAL, only 15 with an upstream fix. `PORTAINER.md` and
+  `SECURITY_REPORT.md` now carry a table of what gates and what does not, replacing
+  descriptions of checks that never ran.
+
 ### Reporting
 
 - `[x]` Week-1 client report (`Relatorio-Semana-1-DTF.docx`), corrected 2026-09-18 to