ci: add the release gates, and document the ones that do not gate

PORTAINER.md and SECURITY_REPORT.md described a pipeline that required
regressions, HIGH/CRITICAL secret, misconfiguration and image gates, and stated
that the source preflight stopped this application from publishing. None of it
ran: the workflow built and called the webhook unconditionally.

Add a blocking Trivy secret scan. Verified both ways: a planted AWS key pair,
GitHub token and private key block the job, and the repository passes clean.
Note that Trivy allowlists documented example credentials, so this gate is a
backstop, not permission to commit secrets.

The source preflight now runs on every push and always prints its verdict, but
enforces only when ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT is true. Enforcing it today
would block every deployment, because it refuses a release while the payment
and messaging adapters are fake, which is the deliberate state the stack runs
in. Set the variable when real adapters land.

Image vulnerabilities are reported after each build rather than enforced. The
current bases carry 56 HIGH and 3 CRITICAL findings, only 15 of them with an
upstream fix, so failing on them would stop releases without making anything
safer. Pinning digests and triaging the fixable ones is ROADMAP 2.6.

Both documents now carry a table of what gates and what does not, instead of
describing checks that did not exist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml

@@ -93,12 +93,59 @@ jobs:
         if: always()
         run: $COMPOSE down -v || true
 
+  scan:
+    name: Secret scan and release gate
+    needs: validate
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    env:
+      TRIVY_IMAGE: ${{ vars.TRIVY_IMAGE }}
+      ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT: ${{ vars.ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT }}
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
+
+      # Blocking. A credential committed by accident must never reach the
+      # registry or the deployed stack, and the repository is clean today, so
+      # this gate costs nothing until it is actually needed.
+      - name: Secret scan
+        run: |
+          image="${TRIVY_IMAGE:-aquasec/trivy:0.58.1}"
+          docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/src:ro" "$image" \
+            fs --scanners secret --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL \
+            --no-progress /src
+
+      # PORTAINER.md described this as blocking publication. It never ran at
+      # all, and turning it on unconditionally would block every deploy: the
+      # source preflight refuses a release while the payment and messaging
+      # adapters are fake, which is the deliberate state the stack runs in
+      # today. So its verdict is always printed, and enforcement is opt-in.
+      # Set the repository variable ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT to "true" once
+      # real adapters land, and this becomes the gate the documentation claims.
+      - name: Production source preflight
+        run: |
+          set +e
+          python3 deploy/production_preflight.py --source-only
+          verdict=$?
+          set -e
+          if [ "$verdict" -eq 0 ]; then
+            echo "Source preflight passes."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          if [ "${ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT:-false}" = "true" ]; then
+            echo "::error::Source preflight blocked the release."
+            exit "$verdict"
+          fi
+          echo "::warning::Source preflight reports blockers (advisory; set ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT=true to gate)."
+
   publish-and-deploy:
     name: Publish images and notify Portainer
-    needs: [validate, integration]
+    needs: [validate, integration, scan]
     if: gitea.event_name == 'push' && gitea.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 45
+    env:
+      TRIVY_IMAGE: ${{ vars.TRIVY_IMAGE }}
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
@@ -127,6 +174,23 @@ jobs:
             --tag "$image:latest" --tag "$image:${{ gitea.sha }}" .
           docker push "$image:latest"
           docker push "$image:${{ gitea.sha }}"
+      # Reported, not blocking. The current bases carry HIGH/CRITICAL findings
+      # with no fix available upstream, so gating on them would stop every
+      # deploy without making anything safer. Read the counts each release, and
+      # see ROADMAP 2.6 for pinning digests and triaging what is fixable.
+      - name: Image vulnerability report
+        run: |
+          image="${TRIVY_IMAGE:-aquasec/trivy:0.58.1}"
+          for target in \
+              "gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-api:${{ gitea.sha }}" \
+              "gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-web:${{ gitea.sha }}"; do
+            echo "--- $target"
+            docker run --rm -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock "$image" \
+              image --scanners vuln --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --no-progress \
+              --format table --exit-code 0 "$target" || \
+              echo "::warning::Could not scan $target"
+          done
+
       - name: Trigger Portainer redeployment
         env:
           PORTAINER_WEBHOOK: ${{ secrets.PORTAINER_WEBHOOK }}