Files
dtf-system/.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml
Cauê Faleiros 9da2a7dcad ci: add the release gates, and document the ones that do not gate
PORTAINER.md and SECURITY_REPORT.md described a pipeline that required
regressions, HIGH/CRITICAL secret, misconfiguration and image gates, and stated
that the source preflight stopped this application from publishing. None of it
ran: the workflow built and called the webhook unconditionally.

Add a blocking Trivy secret scan. Verified both ways: a planted AWS key pair,
GitHub token and private key block the job, and the repository passes clean.
Note that Trivy allowlists documented example credentials, so this gate is a
backstop, not permission to commit secrets.

The source preflight now runs on every push and always prints its verdict, but
enforces only when ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT is true. Enforcing it today
would block every deployment, because it refuses a release while the payment
and messaging adapters are fake, which is the deliberate state the stack runs
in. Set the variable when real adapters land.

Image vulnerabilities are reported after each build rather than enforced. The
current bases carry 56 HIGH and 3 CRITICAL findings, only 15 of them with an
upstream fix, so failing on them would stop releases without making anything
safer. Pinning digests and triaging the fixable ones is ROADMAP 2.6.

Both documents now carry a table of what gates and what does not, instead of
describing checks that did not exist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 11:45:11 -03:00

203 lines
7.8 KiB
YAML

name: Build and deploy
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches: [main]
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
validate:
name: Validate source
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- name: Run fast regression checks
run: |
python3 -m py_compile local/*.py deploy/*.py
python3 -m unittest \
local.test_dependency_lock \
local.test_staging_readiness \
deploy.test_production_preflight \
local.test_pricing \
local.test_secrets -v
sh -n local/lock_dependencies.sh
integration:
name: Integration suite on a real stack
needs: validate
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 45
env:
SITE_PORT: "8080"
KANBAN_PORT: "8081"
API_PORT: "8000"
COMPOSE: docker compose -f compose.local.yaml
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
# py_compile cannot see an unresolved name, and the four unit tests above
# never start the application. A missing import in local/auth.py therefore
# reached production and returned 500 on every session, login and
# registration. These suites exercise the running stack and would have
# failed on it immediately.
- name: Start the stack
run: |
$COMPOSE up --build -d --wait --wait-timeout 600
$COMPOSE ps
- name: API and workflow regressions
run: |
python3 -m local.smoke_test
python3 -m local.workflow_test
python3 -m local.security_test
python3 -m local.scanning_test
- name: Runtime and retention regressions
run: |
$COMPOSE exec -T api python -m local.retention_test
$COMPOSE exec -T api python -m local.runtime_security_test
# These need a real Chrome. They are the only coverage for the artwork
# editor and the full customer journey, so install google-chrome-stable
# (or set CHROME_BIN) on the runner to make them gate deployments. The
# suites above stay hard gates either way.
- name: Browser regressions
run: |
for candidate in "$CHROME_BIN" /usr/bin/google-chrome-stable \
/usr/bin/google-chrome /usr/bin/chromium /usr/bin/chromium-browser; do
if [ -n "$candidate" ] && [ -x "$candidate" ]; then
export CHROME_BIN="$candidate"
break
fi
done
if [ ! -x "${CHROME_BIN:-}" ]; then
echo "::warning::No Chrome on this runner; browser regressions were NOT run."
echo "Install google-chrome-stable or set CHROME_BIN to gate on them."
exit 0
fi
echo "Using $CHROME_BIN"
node local/artwork_browser_test.mjs
node local/browser_test.mjs
- name: Diagnostics on failure
if: failure()
run: |
$COMPOSE ps || true
$COMPOSE logs --tail 200 api worker site kanban || true
- name: Tear down
if: always()
run: $COMPOSE down -v || true
scan:
name: Secret scan and release gate
needs: validate
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
env:
TRIVY_IMAGE: ${{ vars.TRIVY_IMAGE }}
ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT: ${{ vars.ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT }}
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
# Blocking. A credential committed by accident must never reach the
# registry or the deployed stack, and the repository is clean today, so
# this gate costs nothing until it is actually needed.
- name: Secret scan
run: |
image="${TRIVY_IMAGE:-aquasec/trivy:0.58.1}"
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/src:ro" "$image" \
fs --scanners secret --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL \
--no-progress /src
# PORTAINER.md described this as blocking publication. It never ran at
# all, and turning it on unconditionally would block every deploy: the
# source preflight refuses a release while the payment and messaging
# adapters are fake, which is the deliberate state the stack runs in
# today. So its verdict is always printed, and enforcement is opt-in.
# Set the repository variable ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT to "true" once
# real adapters land, and this becomes the gate the documentation claims.
- name: Production source preflight
run: |
set +e
python3 deploy/production_preflight.py --source-only
verdict=$?
set -e
if [ "$verdict" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "Source preflight passes."
exit 0
fi
if [ "${ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT:-false}" = "true" ]; then
echo "::error::Source preflight blocked the release."
exit "$verdict"
fi
echo "::warning::Source preflight reports blockers (advisory; set ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT=true to gate)."
publish-and-deploy:
name: Publish images and notify Portainer
needs: [validate, integration, scan]
if: gitea.event_name == 'push' && gitea.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 45
env:
TRIVY_IMAGE: ${{ vars.TRIVY_IMAGE }}
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- name: Sign in to the Gitea Container Registry
env:
REGISTRY_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
run: |
test -n "$REGISTRY_USERNAME"
test -n "$REGISTRY_TOKEN"
echo "$REGISTRY_TOKEN" | docker login gitea.blyzer.com.br \
--username "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
- name: Build and publish API
run: |
image="gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-api"
docker build --pull --file deploy/Dockerfile.api \
--build-arg VCS_REF="${{ gitea.sha }}" \
--tag "$image:latest" --tag "$image:${{ gitea.sha }}" .
docker push "$image:latest"
docker push "$image:${{ gitea.sha }}"
- name: Build and publish web
run: |
image="gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-web"
docker build --pull --file deploy/Dockerfile.web \
--build-arg VCS_REF="${{ gitea.sha }}" \
--tag "$image:latest" --tag "$image:${{ gitea.sha }}" .
docker push "$image:latest"
docker push "$image:${{ gitea.sha }}"
# Reported, not blocking. The current bases carry HIGH/CRITICAL findings
# with no fix available upstream, so gating on them would stop every
# deploy without making anything safer. Read the counts each release, and
# see ROADMAP 2.6 for pinning digests and triaging what is fixable.
- name: Image vulnerability report
run: |
image="${TRIVY_IMAGE:-aquasec/trivy:0.58.1}"
for target in \
"gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-api:${{ gitea.sha }}" \
"gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-web:${{ gitea.sha }}"; do
echo "--- $target"
docker run --rm -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock "$image" \
image --scanners vuln --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --no-progress \
--format table --exit-code 0 "$target" || \
echo "::warning::Could not scan $target"
done
- name: Trigger Portainer redeployment
env:
PORTAINER_WEBHOOK: ${{ secrets.PORTAINER_WEBHOOK }}
run: |
if [ -z "$PORTAINER_WEBHOOK" ]; then
echo "PORTAINER_WEBHOOK is not configured; images were published but deployment was skipped."
exit 0
fi
curl --fail --silent --show-error --max-time 30 --request POST "$PORTAINER_WEBHOOK"