96f1d27221
dtf-site.html held commercial rules, the nesting engine, PDF analysis, the cart and every handler in a single inline script, 42% of the runtime code in one file, and the money logic lived in the middle of it. It is now nine files under local/static, cut at the section markers the original author left, so no function was split across a boundary: config, product modes, upload, sheet analysis, PDF, quality, packing, cart, flow. They load as classic scripts in the original order and share one global scope, so evaluation is exactly what it was; the extraction was checked byte-identical against the original before the tags replaced it. dtf-site.html is 1,394 lines of markup and style. With no inline script left anywhere, the policy no longer needs a hash allowlist: script-src is now 'self' alone, which is stronger than what it replaced and cannot drift as the page changes. Three things depended on the old shape and were updated rather than worked around. The pricing parity test read the ladder out of the HTML and now reads it from site-config.js, still proving the server agrees with what the customer is shown. The isolated artwork test served four hardcoded script paths and now serves any script that resolves inside local/static, so the next file added does not silently 404. The CSP assertion checked the whole policy for 'unsafe-inline' and now checks the script-src directive alone, since style-src legitimately carries it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
85 lines
4.7 KiB
Python
85 lines
4.7 KiB
Python
"""Non-destructive localhost security regressions. Leaves tiny test upload reservations."""
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import base64
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import os
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from urllib.error import HTTPError
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from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
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from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
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from uuid import uuid4
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from .smoke_test import Client, BASE, with_host
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def raw(path, expected, headers=None, body=None):
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request=Request(BASE+path, data=body, headers=with_host(headers))
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try:
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with urlopen(request,timeout=10) as response:
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assert response.status==expected
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return response.headers
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except HTTPError as error:
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assert error.code==expected,(path,error.code,expected)
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return error.headers
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def run():
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headers=raw('/',200)
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policy=headers['Content-Security-Policy']
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assert "script-src-attr 'none'" in policy and "frame-ancestors 'none'" in policy
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# The Site has no inline script, so the policy needs no hash allowlist at all.
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# Assert the property that matters rather than the mechanism: nothing inline
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# executes, and any hash that does appear was added deliberately at build time.
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script_src = next(d.strip() for d in policy.split(';') if d.strip().startswith('script-src '))
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assert "'unsafe-inline'" not in script_src and "'unsafe-eval'" not in script_src, script_src
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assert script_src == "script-src 'self'", script_src
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assert "object-src 'none'" in policy
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assert 'cdnjs' not in policy, 'pdf.js is vendored; no CDN belongs in the policy'
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raw('/api/health',400,{'Host':'attacker.invalid'})
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raw('/api/account/logout',403,{'Content-Type':'application/json','Origin':'https://attacker.invalid'},b'{}')
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raw('/api/account/logout',403,{'Content-Type':'application/json','Origin':'http://localhost:9999'},b'{}')
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print('PASS: CSP, frame protection, Host and cross-origin rejection')
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operator=Client()
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credentials={'email':os.environ.get('OPERATOR_EMAIL','operator@example.test'),'password':os.environ.get('OPERATOR_PASSWORD','local-operator-only')}
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encoded=base64.b64encode((credentials['email']+':'+credentials['password']).encode()).decode()
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raw('/api/operator/board',401,{'Authorization':'Basic '+encoded})
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operator.call('/operator/login',credentials)
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token=next(c for c in operator.jar if c.name=='dtf_operator')
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assert token.has_nonstandard_attr('HttpOnly') and token.get_nonstandard_attr('SameSite')=='strict'
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assert token.path=='/api/operator'
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operator.call('/operator/board')
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replay=Client();replay.jar.set_cookie(token)
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operator.call('/operator/logout',{})
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replay.call('/operator/board',expected=401)
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print('PASS: Basic rejected; HttpOnly scoped operator session; server-side logout revocation')
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client=Client();client.call('/session')
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client.call('/uploads',{'name':'payload.html','size':1},expected=422)
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uid=client.call('/uploads',{'name':'SECURITY-PART.cdr','size':3})['id']
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url=client.call('/uploads/'+uid+'/parts/1',{})['url']
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assert 'content-length' in parse_qs(urlparse(url).query)['X-Amz-SignedHeaders'][0]
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try:
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urlopen(Request(url,data=b'toolong',method='PUT'),timeout=10)
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raise AssertionError('Signed part accepted wrong length')
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except HTTPError as error:assert error.code==403,error.code
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with urlopen(Request(url,data=b'abc',method='PUT'),timeout=10) as response:assert response.status==200
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client.call('/uploads/'+uid+'/complete',{})
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count=int(os.environ.get('MAX_PENDING_UPLOADS','10'))
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for i in range(count):client.call('/uploads',{'name':'SECURITY-PENDING.cdr','size':1})
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client.call('/uploads',{'name':'SECURITY-OVER-LIMIT.cdr','size':1},expected=429)
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print('PASS: extension allowlist, exact multipart Content-Length signature, pending upload quota')
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# Unique identity avoids locking out the real local operator.
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attacker=Client();email='test-'+uuid4().hex+'@example.test'
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for _ in range(10):attacker.call('/operator/login',{'email':email,'password':'invalid'},expected=401)
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attacker.call('/operator/login',{'email':email,'password':'invalid'},expected=429)
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print('PASS: operator login throttling (only synthetic account bucket exhausted)')
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# Guest sessions are limited per source, not once for the whole deployment.
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# Keyed on the environment name this was a single global bucket of 120 per
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# 15 minutes, which the suites above would already have eaten into.
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for _ in range(25):
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Client().call('/session')
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# A forged forwarded address must not let a client pick another bucket: the
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# gateway overwrites the header, so these count against the real source too.
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for _ in range(5):
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raw('/api/session',200,{'X-Forwarded-For':'203.0.113.7'})
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print('PASS: guest sessions limited per source, forwarded address not client-controlled')
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if __name__=='__main__':run()
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