b329f76378
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local/ held six unrelated things under a name that stopped being true once it
became the production runtime: the service, the frontend, the tests, the ops
commands, the container definitions and the dependency lock, 65 files with
nothing to tell them apart.
app/ the service: api/ routers, core/ for identity, database, models,
prices and secret loading, and the worker, bootstrap and schema
tests/ the twelve suites, no longer inside the shipped package
ops/ backup, readiness, dependency audit, security summary
infra/ Dockerfiles, gateway templates, ClamAV and storage configuration,
the requirements and their hash lock
web/ the Site, Kanban and portal pages with their scripts
deploy/Dockerfile.api now copies app/ alone, so the tests stop shipping to
production; the local image still carries them, because the suites run inside
the stack's network.
Five kinds of reference had to follow, and each was found by something different
rather than by reading. Imports of the form "from . import db" survived a rewrite
that only matched "from .db import". Tests kept relative imports of modules that
had left the package. A mock.patch target names its module in a string, where no
import rewriting can see it. The browser test resolves a fixture by path. And the
release gate's markers pointed at local/runtime.py and local/worker.py, which is
the decay its new marker test exists to catch — it caught it.
Verified from docker compose down -v: the stack starts, all six integration
suites, both browser suites and the twenty-nine unit tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
85 lines
4.7 KiB
Python
85 lines
4.7 KiB
Python
"""Non-destructive localhost security regressions. Leaves tiny test upload reservations."""
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import base64
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import os
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from urllib.error import HTTPError
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from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
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from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
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from uuid import uuid4
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from tests.smoke_test import Client, BASE, with_host
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def raw(path, expected, headers=None, body=None):
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request=Request(BASE+path, data=body, headers=with_host(headers))
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try:
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with urlopen(request,timeout=10) as response:
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assert response.status==expected
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return response.headers
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except HTTPError as error:
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assert error.code==expected,(path,error.code,expected)
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return error.headers
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def run():
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headers=raw('/',200)
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policy=headers['Content-Security-Policy']
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assert "script-src-attr 'none'" in policy and "frame-ancestors 'none'" in policy
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# The Site has no inline script, so the policy needs no hash allowlist at all.
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# Assert the property that matters rather than the mechanism: nothing inline
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# executes, and any hash that does appear was added deliberately at build time.
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script_src = next(d.strip() for d in policy.split(';') if d.strip().startswith('script-src '))
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assert "'unsafe-inline'" not in script_src and "'unsafe-eval'" not in script_src, script_src
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assert script_src == "script-src 'self'", script_src
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assert "object-src 'none'" in policy
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assert 'cdnjs' not in policy, 'pdf.js is vendored; no CDN belongs in the policy'
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raw('/api/health',400,{'Host':'attacker.invalid'})
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raw('/api/account/logout',403,{'Content-Type':'application/json','Origin':'https://attacker.invalid'},b'{}')
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raw('/api/account/logout',403,{'Content-Type':'application/json','Origin':'http://localhost:9999'},b'{}')
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print('PASS: CSP, frame protection, Host and cross-origin rejection')
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operator=Client()
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credentials={'email':os.environ.get('OPERATOR_EMAIL','operator@example.test'),'password':os.environ.get('OPERATOR_PASSWORD','local-operator-only')}
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encoded=base64.b64encode((credentials['email']+':'+credentials['password']).encode()).decode()
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raw('/api/operator/board',401,{'Authorization':'Basic '+encoded})
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operator.call('/operator/login',credentials)
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token=next(c for c in operator.jar if c.name=='dtf_operator')
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assert token.has_nonstandard_attr('HttpOnly') and token.get_nonstandard_attr('SameSite')=='strict'
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assert token.path=='/api/operator'
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operator.call('/operator/board')
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replay=Client();replay.jar.set_cookie(token)
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operator.call('/operator/logout',{})
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replay.call('/operator/board',expected=401)
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print('PASS: Basic rejected; HttpOnly scoped operator session; server-side logout revocation')
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client=Client();client.call('/session')
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client.call('/uploads',{'name':'payload.html','size':1},expected=422)
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uid=client.call('/uploads',{'name':'SECURITY-PART.cdr','size':3})['id']
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url=client.call('/uploads/'+uid+'/parts/1',{})['url']
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assert 'content-length' in parse_qs(urlparse(url).query)['X-Amz-SignedHeaders'][0]
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try:
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urlopen(Request(url,data=b'toolong',method='PUT'),timeout=10)
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raise AssertionError('Signed part accepted wrong length')
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except HTTPError as error:assert error.code==403,error.code
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with urlopen(Request(url,data=b'abc',method='PUT'),timeout=10) as response:assert response.status==200
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client.call('/uploads/'+uid+'/complete',{})
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count=int(os.environ.get('MAX_PENDING_UPLOADS','10'))
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for i in range(count):client.call('/uploads',{'name':'SECURITY-PENDING.cdr','size':1})
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client.call('/uploads',{'name':'SECURITY-OVER-LIMIT.cdr','size':1},expected=429)
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print('PASS: extension allowlist, exact multipart Content-Length signature, pending upload quota')
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# Unique identity avoids locking out the real local operator.
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attacker=Client();email='test-'+uuid4().hex+'@example.test'
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for _ in range(10):attacker.call('/operator/login',{'email':email,'password':'invalid'},expected=401)
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attacker.call('/operator/login',{'email':email,'password':'invalid'},expected=429)
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print('PASS: operator login throttling (only synthetic account bucket exhausted)')
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# Guest sessions are limited per source, not once for the whole deployment.
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# Keyed on the environment name this was a single global bucket of 120 per
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# 15 minutes, which the suites above would already have eaten into.
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for _ in range(25):
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Client().call('/session')
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# A forged forwarded address must not let a client pick another bucket: the
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# gateway overwrites the header, so these count against the real source too.
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for _ in range(5):
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raw('/api/session',200,{'X-Forwarded-For':'203.0.113.7'})
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print('PASS: guest sessions limited per source, forwarded address not client-controlled')
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if __name__=='__main__':run()
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