52ae13c9a1
uvicorn does not trust forwarded headers from a peer outside forwarded_allow_ips, so request.client.host was the web gateway for every request. The auth-source bucket therefore counted all customers together: 60 failed logins from one attacker locked out everyone. Security events recorded the gateway address, which made the audit trail useless for attribution. The gateway now overwrites X-Forwarded-For with the peer address it observed instead of appending to whatever the client sent, so the header carries one value the client cannot choose, and client_ip() resolves it with a fallback to the connection peer. The guest-session limiter was keyed on the environment name, making it one global bucket of 120 per 15 minutes: roughly eight new visitors a minute for the whole site before legitimate traffic started receiving 429. It is now per source, and the ceiling is deliberately generous because offices and mobile carriers put many real customers behind a single address. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
44 lines
2.3 KiB
Plaintext
44 lines
2.3 KiB
Plaintext
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=api_limit:10m rate=20r/s;
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server {
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listen 8080;
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server_name ${PUBLIC_HOST};
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if ($host != ${PUBLIC_HOST}) { return 400; }
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# Resolve through Docker's embedded DNS at request time. This prevents
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# Nginx from exiting during a Swarm rollout when the API task is briefly
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# unavailable or still creating its database schema.
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resolver 127.0.0.11 ipv6=off valid=10s;
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set $api_upstream api:8000;
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root /usr/share/nginx/html;
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index ${WEB_INDEX};
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add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
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add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff always;
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add_header Referrer-Policy no-referrer always;
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add_header X-Frame-Options DENY always;
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add_header Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()" always;
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add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' @SCRIPT_HASHES@ https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://cdn.vnda.com.br; connect-src 'self' ${S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT} https://cdn.vnda.com.br https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; worker-src 'self' blob: https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'" always;
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location = /health { access_log off; return 200 'ok'; }
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location /api/ {
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limit_req zone=api_limit burst=100 nodelay;
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limit_req_status 429;
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proxy_pass http://$api_upstream;
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proxy_http_version 1.1;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $host;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
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# Overwrite, never append: $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for keeps any header the
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# client sent, and the leftmost value would then be attacker-controlled.
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
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proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
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proxy_read_timeout 30s;
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client_max_body_size 2m;
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}
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# Always revalidate HTML/JS/CSS after a deployment. Without this, a browser
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# can pair a new Kanban page with a cached older script after a rollout.
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location / {
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expires -1;
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try_files $uri $uri/ =404;
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}
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}
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