Files
dtf-system/tests/runtime_security_test.py
Cauê Faleiros b329f76378
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refactor: lay the repository out by role
local/ held six unrelated things under a name that stopped being true once it
became the production runtime: the service, the frontend, the tests, the ops
commands, the container definitions and the dependency lock, 65 files with
nothing to tell them apart.

  app/      the service: api/ routers, core/ for identity, database, models,
            prices and secret loading, and the worker, bootstrap and schema
  tests/    the twelve suites, no longer inside the shipped package
  ops/      backup, readiness, dependency audit, security summary
  infra/    Dockerfiles, gateway templates, ClamAV and storage configuration,
            the requirements and their hash lock
  web/      the Site, Kanban and portal pages with their scripts

deploy/Dockerfile.api now copies app/ alone, so the tests stop shipping to
production; the local image still carries them, because the suites run inside
the stack's network.

Five kinds of reference had to follow, and each was found by something different
rather than by reading. Imports of the form "from . import db" survived a rewrite
that only matched "from .db import". Tests kept relative imports of modules that
had left the package. A mock.patch target names its module in a string, where no
import rewriting can see it. The browser test resolves a fixture by path. And the
release gate's markers pointed at local/runtime.py and local/worker.py, which is
the decay its new marker test exists to catch — it caught it.

Verified from docker compose down -v: the stack starts, all six integration
suites, both browser suites and the twenty-nine unit tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 17:40:57 -03:00

88 lines
5.1 KiB
Python

"""Run inside API container: permissions, hashing and fail-closed scanner unit checks."""
import hashlib
from unittest.mock import patch
from botocore.exceptions import ClientError
from app.core.db import connect
from app.adapters import LocalS3Storage
from app.core.auth import client_ip, password_hash, password_matches
from app.scanning import ClamAV, require_clean
from fastapi import HTTPException
class FakeRequest:
def __init__(self, headers=None, peer='10.0.0.2'):
self.headers=headers or {}
self.client=type('C',(),{'host':peer})() if peer else None
def check_client_ip():
"""The gateway hands one address; a direct peer falls back to its own."""
# Gateway-set header wins over the connection peer, which is the gateway.
assert client_ip(FakeRequest({'x-forwarded-for':'198.51.100.9'}))=='198.51.100.9'
# Only the first entry is used, and it is length-capped.
assert client_ip(FakeRequest({'x-forwarded-for':'198.51.100.9, 10.0.0.2'}))=='198.51.100.9'
assert len(client_ip(FakeRequest({'x-forwarded-for':'a'*500})))<=64
# No header: the peer address, never a constant shared by every request.
assert client_ip(FakeRequest(peer='192.0.2.5'))=='192.0.2.5'
assert client_ip(FakeRequest({'x-forwarded-for':' '},peer='192.0.2.5'))=='192.0.2.5'
assert client_ip(FakeRequest(peer=None))=='unknown'
print('PASS: client address resolution for rate-limit buckets and audit events')
def check_operator_accounts():
"""Accounts are per person, and disabling one ends its access at once."""
from uuid import uuid4
from app.core.auth import password_hash, password_matches
from app.operators import seed_from_environment, set_active
email='runtime-check-'+uuid4().hex[:8]+'@example.test'
with connect() as c:
c.execute('INSERT INTO dtf_local.operators(id,email,name,password_hash) VALUES(%s,%s,%s,%s)',
(uuid4(), email, 'Runtime Check', password_hash('runtime-check-password')))
row=c.execute('SELECT * FROM dtf_local.operators WHERE email=%s',(email,)).fetchone()
assert row['active'] and password_matches('runtime-check-password', row['password_hash'])
assert not password_matches('wrong', row['password_hash'])
# Seeding is once-only: a password changed here must survive a redeploy.
c.execute("INSERT INTO dtf_local.operator_sessions(token_hash,username) VALUES(%s,%s)",
('runtime-check-'+uuid4().hex, email))
set_active(email, False)
with connect() as c:
row=c.execute('SELECT active FROM dtf_local.operators WHERE email=%s',(email,)).fetchone()
sessions=c.execute('SELECT count(*) AS n FROM dtf_local.operator_sessions WHERE username=%s',
(email,)).fetchone()['n']
assert not row['active'], 'disable did not deactivate'
assert sessions==0, 'disable left an open session behind'
c.execute('DELETE FROM dtf_local.operators WHERE email=%s',(email,))
print('PASS: per-operator accounts, password verification, immediate revocation on disable')
def run():
check_client_ip()
check_operator_accounts()
with connect() as c:
role=c.execute('SELECT rolsuper,rolcreatedb,rolcreaterole,rolbypassrls FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname=current_user').fetchone()
assert not any(role.values()),role
assert not c.execute("SELECT has_schema_privilege(current_user,'dtf_local','CREATE') AS allowed").fetchone()['allowed']
storage=LocalS3Storage()
storage.health()
visible={bucket['Name'] for bucket in storage.client.list_buckets()['Buckets']}
assert visible=={storage.bucket},visible
for call in (lambda:storage.client.get_bucket_policy(Bucket=storage.bucket),
lambda:storage.client.get_object(Bucket=storage.bucket,Key='outside-runtime-prefix/test.cdr')):
try:call();raise AssertionError('Runtime storage credentials have excessive privilege')
except ClientError as error:assert error.response['ResponseMetadata']['HTTPStatusCode']==403
password='test-password-for-hash'
salt='00'*16
old='scrypt$'+salt+'$'+hashlib.scrypt(password.encode(),salt=bytes.fromhex(salt),n=16384,r=8,p=1).hex()
assert password_matches(password,old)
new=password_hash(password)
assert new.startswith('scrypt-v2$') and password_matches(password,new)
assert not password_matches('wrong',new)
for state in ('pending','error','rejected'):
try:require_clean({'complete':True,'scan_state':state});raise AssertionError('Unscanned file released')
except HTTPException as error:assert error.status_code==409
require_clean({'complete':True,'scan_state':'clean'})
assert ClamAV().ping() and ClamAV().version().startswith('ClamAV ')
assert ClamAV().scan(None,134217729)[0]=='rejected'
with patch('app.scanning.socket.create_connection',side_effect=OSError('offline')):
try:ClamAV().scan(None,1);raise AssertionError('Offline scanner returned success')
except OSError:pass
print('PASS: runtime DB/S3 least privilege, legacy/current password hashes, quarantine states and scanner size/offline behavior')
if __name__=='__main__':run()