feat: serve pdf.js from this origin instead of a CDN

The Site pulled pdf.js 3.11.174 from cdnjs with no integrity attribute, and the
policy trusted the whole of cdnjs.cloudflare.com for both script-src and
worker-src. Anything that host served would have executed, and a customer
measuring a PDF sheet depended on it being reachable.

Vendor both files instead of pinning a hash: it removes the dependency rather
than constraining it, and lets the policy name only 'self'. Provenance and
SHA-256 digests are recorded in local/static/vendor/README.md, verified on
download against the SRI digests cdnjs publishes for that release.

cdnjs is now absent from script-src, worker-src and connect-src in both gateway
templates. Workers are 'self' plus blob:, which the Site needs for the worker it
constructs itself.

Verified in a browser against the running stack: pdf.js loads from /vendor/, the
blob worker starts, and a real seven-page PDF parses with no CSP violation. Both
browser suites and the full integration suite pass.

The version is deliberately unchanged. 3.11.174 is old, but its known eval path
is already closed by isEvalSupported:false, and upgrading is an API change that
needs its own testing rather than riding along with this.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ jobs:
       # taken on the machine itself. Known occupants of that host:
       #   8000, 9443  Portainer (the Edge tunnel and its UI)
       #   18080/18081 the production dtf-cloud stack (docker-compose.yml defaults)
-      #   8080/8081   deploy/stack.yaml defaults
       #   9000/9001   MinIO defaults elsewhere
       # This block avoids all of them. Ephemeral ports are not an option: the
       # published port is baked into PUBLIC_ORIGIN, ALLOWED_ORIGINS and the CSP

PORTAINER.md

@@ -4,7 +4,13 @@ DTF follows the same operating model as Graphs and ComporHUB: Gitea builds
 prebuilt images, pushes them to the Gitea registry, and calls one Portainer
 webhook. Portainer owns and redeploys one Docker Swarm stack named `dtf-cloud`.
 
-The production stack is `deploy/stack.yaml`. It contains Site, Kanban, API,
+The deployed stack is the repository's `docker-compose.yml`, which the
+`dtf-cloud` Portainer stack points at. `deploy/stack.yaml` is a more hardened
+definition that supplies every credential as a Docker secret rather than an
+environment variable; it is not currently deployed. See `ROADMAP.md` 2.12 before
+assuming either is authoritative.
+
+`deploy/stack.yaml` contains Site, Kanban, API,
 worker, PostgreSQL, ClamAV, and a one-time database initializer. Production uses
 Cloudflare R2, so MinIO is not part of this stack.
 

ROADMAP.md

@@ -222,16 +222,57 @@ refactor: `'This runtime only supports APP_ENV=local'`,
 - Replace marker matching with behavioural assertions (import the module, assert
   the adapter classes in use).
 
+### `[x]` 2.12 — Two divergent stack definitions; the docs named the wrong one
+
+Found 2026-09-21 by asking which file Portainer deploys. `PORTAINER.md` called
+`deploy/stack.yaml` "the production stack"; the deployed file is the repository's
+`docker-compose.yml`. `deploy/stack.yaml` came from the first commit and was never
+deployed — it supplied credentials as Docker secrets where the deployed file uses
+plain environment variables.
+
+**Decision (2026-09-21): keep `docker-compose.yml`, delete `deploy/stack.yaml`.**
+
+The gain from Docker secrets here is narrower than it sounds. It keeps values out
+of `docker inspect` and the Portainer UI, but `local/secrets.py` loads them into
+the process environment anyway, and anyone who can read `docker inspect` is
+already root or in the docker group and could read the secret files directly. The
+operator is the only Portainer user, so the main benefit — limiting what a
+lower-privileged console user can see — does not apply. Maintaining two
+definitions that drift was the larger real cost.
+
+`local/secrets.py` stays. It is inert against the deployed file and costs nothing,
+and it means a stack can switch to Docker secrets later without a code change.
+
+Still open: **rotate the R2 secret key.** Not because of Portainer, but because it
+grants read and write over every customer's artwork and has been readable from the
+stack environment for some time. The operator password is worth rotating with it.
+
 ### `[x]` 2.6 — Base images are not pinned `(F10)`
 
 Dockerfiles default to mutable `python:3.12-slim` / `nginx:1.28-alpine`, the
 workflow passes no digest build-args, and `--pull` makes builds non-reproducible —
 while `PORTAINER.md` documents digest-pinned immutable bases.
 
-### `[ ]` 2.7 — pdf.js loaded from CDN without integrity `(F11)`
+### `[x]` 2.7 — pdf.js loaded from CDN without integrity `(F11)`
 
-3.11.174 from `cdnjs`, no SRI, and CSP allows the whole host for `script-src` **and**
+Vendored rather than integrity-pinned, so the Site no longer depends on a third
-`worker-src`. Vendor the asset or pin `integrity` and narrow the CSP to the exact path.
+party being reachable and honest when a customer opens it. Both files are served
+from this origin and their provenance is recorded in `local/static/vendor/README.md`,
+verified against the SRI digests cdnjs publishes for 3.11.174.
+
+`cdnjs.cloudflare.com` is gone from `script-src`, `worker-src` and `connect-src` in
+both gateway templates: scripts and workers are now `'self'` plus `blob:` for the
+worker the Site builds itself.
+
+Verified in a browser against the running stack: pdf.js loads from `/vendor/`,
+the blob worker starts, and a real 7-page PDF parses with no CSP violation. Both
+browser suites and the full integration suite pass.
+
+**Still open: the version.** 3.11.174 is old. GHSA-wgrm-67xf-hhpq is mitigated —
+`dtf-site.html` already passes `isEvalSupported: false`, which is the documented
+workaround — but staying on it indefinitely is not a posture. Upgrading is an API
+change rather than a file swap and needs its own browser testing, so it is
+deliberately not bundled here.
 
 ### `[ ]` 2.8 — Single shared operator credential `(F12)`
 

deploy/README.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ The DTF application is one Portainer-owned Docker Swarm stack. Gitea builds,
 tests, scans, and publishes the two application images, then calls the stack's
 Portainer webhook. Start with the short operator guide in `../PORTAINER.md`.
 
-- `stack.yaml` — the single Portainer stack.
+- The deployed stack is the repository's `docker-compose.yml`, not a file here.
 - `Dockerfile.api` and `Dockerfile.web` — prebuilt registry images.
 - `portainer.env.example` — non-secret Portainer variables.
 - `production_preflight.py` — fail-closed application/configuration validator.

deploy/nginx.conf.template

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ server {
     add_header Referrer-Policy no-referrer always;
     add_header X-Frame-Options DENY always;
     add_header Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()" always;
-    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' @SCRIPT_HASHES@ https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://cdn.vnda.com.br; connect-src 'self' ${S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT} https://cdn.vnda.com.br https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; worker-src 'self' blob: https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'" always;
+    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' @SCRIPT_HASHES@; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://cdn.vnda.com.br; connect-src 'self' ${S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT} https://cdn.vnda.com.br; worker-src 'self' blob:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'" always;
 
     location = /health { access_log off; return 200 'ok'; }
     location /api/ {

deploy/stack.yaml

@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
-version: "3.8"
-
-x-app-environment: &app-environment
-  APP_ENV: production
-  DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/database_url
-  S3_ENDPOINT: ${R2_ENDPOINT:?set R2_ENDPOINT}
-  S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT: ${R2_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT:?set R2_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT}
-  S3_BUCKET: ${R2_BUCKET:?set R2_BUCKET}
-  AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID_FILE: /run/secrets/r2_access_key_id
-  AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/r2_secret_access_key
-  AWS_DEFAULT_REGION: auto
-  # The Kanban authenticates by email; the runtime reads OPERATOR_EMAIL.
-  OPERATOR_EMAIL: ${OPERATOR_EMAIL:?set OPERATOR_EMAIL}
-  OPERATOR_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/operator_password
-  PAYMENT_ADAPTER: ${PAYMENT_ADAPTER:?set PAYMENT_ADAPTER}
-  FREIGHT_ADAPTER: ${FREIGHT_ADAPTER:?set FREIGHT_ADAPTER}
-  TINY_ADAPTER: ${TINY_ADAPTER:?set TINY_ADAPTER}
-  WHATSAPP_ADAPTER: ${WHATSAPP_ADAPTER:?set WHATSAPP_ADAPTER}
-  STORAGE_ADAPTER: s3-r2
-  PAYMENT_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/payment_token
-  PAYMENT_WEBHOOK_SECRET_FILE: /run/secrets/payment_webhook_secret
-  TINY_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/tiny_token
-  WHATSAPP_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/whatsapp_token
-  PUBLIC_ORIGIN: ${PUBLIC_ORIGIN:?set PUBLIC_ORIGIN}
-  PUBLIC_HOST: ${PUBLIC_HOST:?set PUBLIC_HOST}
-  ALLOWED_HOSTS: ${PUBLIC_HOST:?set PUBLIC_HOST},${KANBAN_HOST:?set KANBAN_HOST}
-  ALLOWED_ORIGINS: ${PUBLIC_ORIGIN:?set PUBLIC_ORIGIN},https://${KANBAN_HOST:?set KANBAN_HOST}
-  COOKIE_SECURE: "true"
-  MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES: ${MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:-5368709120}
-  UPLOAD_PART_BYTES: ${UPLOAD_PART_BYTES:-8388608}
-  STORAGE_QUOTA_BYTES: ${STORAGE_QUOTA_BYTES:?set STORAGE_QUOTA_BYTES}
-  OWNER_UPLOAD_QUOTA_BYTES: ${OWNER_UPLOAD_QUOTA_BYTES:?set OWNER_UPLOAD_QUOTA_BYTES}
-  MAX_PENDING_UPLOADS: ${MAX_PENDING_UPLOADS:-10}
-  SCAN_MAX_BYTES: ${SCAN_MAX_BYTES:-134217728}
-
-x-app-secrets: &app-secrets
-  - database_url
-  - r2_access_key_id
-  - r2_secret_access_key
-  - operator_password
-  - payment_token
-  - payment_webhook_secret
-  - tiny_token
-  - whatsapp_token
-
-x-rolling: &rolling
-  update_config:
-    parallelism: 1
-    delay: 10s
-    order: start-first
-    failure_action: rollback
-    monitor: 45s
-  rollback_config:
-    parallelism: 1
-    delay: 5s
-    order: start-first
-    failure_action: pause
-    monitor: 45s
-  restart_policy:
-    condition: on-failure
-    delay: 5s
-    max_attempts: 5
-    window: 60s
-
-services:
-  db:
-    image: ${POSTGRES_IMAGE:?set POSTGRES_IMAGE}
-    environment:
-      POSTGRES_DB: ${POSTGRES_DB:?set POSTGRES_DB}
-      POSTGRES_USER: ${POSTGRES_USER:?set POSTGRES_USER}
-      POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/db_admin_password
-    secrets: [db_admin_password]
-    volumes:
-      - postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
-    networks: [backend]
-    healthcheck:
-      test: [CMD-SHELL, 'pg_isready -U "$$POSTGRES_USER" -d "$$POSTGRES_DB"']
-      interval: 10s
-      timeout: 5s
-      retries: 12
-      start_period: 20s
-    stop_grace_period: 60s
-    deploy:
-      replicas: 1
-      placement:
-        constraints: [node.labels.dtf_database == true]
-      update_config:
-        parallelism: 1
-        order: stop-first
-        failure_action: rollback
-        monitor: 60s
-      rollback_config:
-        parallelism: 1
-        order: stop-first
-        failure_action: pause
-        monitor: 60s
-      restart_policy:
-        condition: on-failure
-        delay: 10s
-        max_attempts: 5
-        window: 120s
-      resources:
-        limits: {cpus: "2.0", memory: 4G}
-        reservations: {cpus: "0.5", memory: 1G}
-
-  db-init:
-    image: ${API_IMAGE:?set API_IMAGE}:${IMAGE_TAG:-latest}
-    command: python -m local.bootstrap
-    environment:
-      APP_ENV: production
-      DATABASE_ADMIN_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/database_admin_url
-      APP_DB_USER: ${APP_DB_USER:?set APP_DB_USER}
-      APP_DB_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/app_db_password
-    secrets: [database_admin_url, app_db_password]
-    networks: [backend]
-    deploy:
-      replicas: 1
-      restart_policy: {condition: none}
-      placement:
-        constraints: [node.platform.os == linux]
-      resources:
-        limits: {cpus: "0.5", memory: 512M}
-
-  scanner:
-    image: ${CLAMAV_IMAGE:?set CLAMAV_IMAGE}
-    user: "100:101"
-    entrypoint: [clamd, --foreground=true, --config-file=/etc/clamav/clamd.conf]
-    configs:
-      - source: clamd_config
-        target: /etc/clamav/clamd.conf
-        mode: 0444
-    networks: [backend]
-    read_only: true
-    cap_drop: [ALL]
-    security_opt: [no-new-privileges:true]
-    tmpfs:
-      - /tmp:uid=100,gid=101,mode=0750
-      - /run/clamav:uid=100,gid=101,mode=0750
-      - /var/log/clamav:uid=100,gid=101,mode=0750
-    healthcheck:
-      test: [CMD, clamdscan, --config-file=/etc/clamav/clamd.conf, --ping, "3"]
-      interval: 15s
-      timeout: 5s
-      retries: 20
-      start_period: 90s
-    deploy:
-      replicas: 1
-      restart_policy: {condition: on-failure, delay: 10s}
-      resources:
-        limits: {cpus: "2.0", memory: 3G}
-        reservations: {cpus: "0.5", memory: 1G}
-
-  api:
-    image: ${API_IMAGE:?set API_IMAGE}:${IMAGE_TAG:-latest}
-    environment: *app-environment
-    secrets: *app-secrets
-    networks: [backend, egress]
-    read_only: true
-    tmpfs: [/tmp]
-    init: true
-    cap_drop: [ALL]
-    security_opt: [no-new-privileges:true]
-    healthcheck:
-      test:
-        - CMD-SHELL
-        - >-
-          python -c "import os,urllib.request; r=urllib.request.Request('http://localhost:8000/health',headers={'Host':os.environ['PUBLIC_HOST']}); urllib.request.urlopen(r,timeout=3)"
-      interval: 10s
-      timeout: 5s
-      retries: 12
-      start_period: 30s
-    stop_grace_period: 30s
-    deploy:
-      <<: *rolling
-      replicas: 2
-      resources:
-        limits: {cpus: "1.0", memory: 1G}
-        reservations: {cpus: "0.25", memory: 256M}
-
-  worker:
-    image: ${API_IMAGE:?set API_IMAGE}:${IMAGE_TAG:-latest}
-    command: python -m local.worker
-    environment:
-      <<: *app-environment
-      CLAMD_HOST: scanner
-    secrets: *app-secrets
-    networks: [backend, egress]
-    read_only: true
-    tmpfs: [/tmp]
-    init: true
-    cap_drop: [ALL]
-    security_opt: [no-new-privileges:true]
-    healthcheck:
-      test: [CMD, python, -c, "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:8002/health',timeout=3)"]
-      interval: 15s
-      timeout: 5s
-      retries: 12
-      start_period: 90s
-    stop_grace_period: 60s
-    deploy:
-      <<: *rolling
-      replicas: 1
-      update_config:
-        parallelism: 1
-        order: stop-first
-        failure_action: rollback
-        monitor: 60s
-      rollback_config:
-        parallelism: 1
-        order: stop-first
-        failure_action: pause
-        monitor: 60s
-      resources:
-        limits: {cpus: "1.5", memory: 2G}
-        reservations: {cpus: "0.25", memory: 512M}
-
-  site:
-    image: ${WEB_IMAGE:?set WEB_IMAGE}:${IMAGE_TAG:-latest}
-    environment:
-      WEB_INDEX: index.html
-      PUBLIC_HOST: ${PUBLIC_HOST:?set PUBLIC_HOST}
-      S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT: ${R2_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT:?set R2_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT}
-    networks: [backend]
-    ports:
-      - target: 8080
-        published: ${SITE_PORT:-8080}
-        protocol: tcp
-        mode: ingress
-    read_only: true
-    tmpfs:
-      - /tmp:uid=101,gid=101,mode=0750
-      - /var/cache/nginx:uid=101,gid=101,mode=0750
-      - /var/run:uid=101,gid=101,mode=0750
-      - /etc/nginx/conf.d:uid=101,gid=101,mode=0750
-    cap_drop: [ALL]
-    security_opt: [no-new-privileges:true]
-    healthcheck:
-      test: [CMD-SHELL, 'wget -q --header="Host: $$PUBLIC_HOST" -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:8080/health']
-      interval: 10s
-      timeout: 5s
-      retries: 12
-      start_period: 15s
-    deploy:
-      <<: *rolling
-      replicas: 2
-      resources:
-        limits: {cpus: "0.5", memory: 256M}
-        reservations: {cpus: "0.1", memory: 64M}
-
-  kanban:
-    image: ${WEB_IMAGE:?set WEB_IMAGE}:${IMAGE_TAG:-latest}
-    environment:
-      WEB_INDEX: kanban.html
-      PUBLIC_HOST: ${KANBAN_HOST:?set KANBAN_HOST}
-      S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT: ${R2_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT:?set R2_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT}
-    networks: [backend]
-    ports:
-      - target: 8080
-        published: ${KANBAN_PORT:-8081}
-        protocol: tcp
-        mode: ingress
-    read_only: true
-    tmpfs:
-      - /tmp:uid=101,gid=101,mode=0750
-      - /var/cache/nginx:uid=101,gid=101,mode=0750
-      - /var/run:uid=101,gid=101,mode=0750
-      - /etc/nginx/conf.d:uid=101,gid=101,mode=0750
-    cap_drop: [ALL]
-    security_opt: [no-new-privileges:true]
-    healthcheck:
-      test: [CMD-SHELL, 'wget -q --header="Host: $$PUBLIC_HOST" -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:8080/health']
-      interval: 10s
-      timeout: 5s
-      retries: 12
-      start_period: 15s
-    deploy:
-      <<: *rolling
-      replicas: 1
-      resources:
-        limits: {cpus: "0.5", memory: 256M}
-        reservations: {cpus: "0.1", memory: 64M}
-
-configs:
-  clamd_config:
-    file: ../local/clamd.conf
-
-secrets:
-  database_url: {external: true, name: "${DATABASE_URL_SECRET:?set DATABASE_URL_SECRET}"}
-  database_admin_url: {external: true, name: "${DATABASE_ADMIN_URL_SECRET:?set DATABASE_ADMIN_URL_SECRET}"}
-  db_admin_password: {external: true, name: "${DB_ADMIN_PASSWORD_SECRET:?set DB_ADMIN_PASSWORD_SECRET}"}
-  app_db_password: {external: true, name: "${APP_DB_PASSWORD_SECRET:?set APP_DB_PASSWORD_SECRET}"}
-  r2_access_key_id: {external: true, name: "${R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID_SECRET:?set R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID_SECRET}"}
-  r2_secret_access_key: {external: true, name: "${R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET:?set R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET}"}
-  operator_password: {external: true, name: "${OPERATOR_PASSWORD_SECRET:?set OPERATOR_PASSWORD_SECRET}"}
-  payment_token: {external: true, name: "${PAYMENT_TOKEN_SECRET:?set PAYMENT_TOKEN_SECRET}"}
-  payment_webhook_secret: {external: true, name: "${PAYMENT_WEBHOOK_SECRET:?set PAYMENT_WEBHOOK_SECRET}"}
-  tiny_token: {external: true, name: "${TINY_TOKEN_SECRET:?set TINY_TOKEN_SECRET}"}
-  whatsapp_token: {external: true, name: "${WHATSAPP_TOKEN_SECRET:?set WHATSAPP_TOKEN_SECRET}"}
-
-volumes:
-  postgres-data:
-    external: true
-    name: ${POSTGRES_VOLUME:?set POSTGRES_VOLUME}
-
-networks:
-  backend:
-    driver: overlay
-    internal: true
-  egress:
-    driver: overlay

dtf-site.html

@@ -1780,8 +1780,11 @@ function analisarFolha(img, larguraCm){
 
 // ── PDF também é conferido: rasteriza a página e mede o DPI das imagens de dentro.
 // Arte vetorial não tem resolução — nesses casos a nota é máxima, e isso é correto.
-const PDFJS_URL='https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/pdf.js/3.11.174/pdf.min.js';
+// Served from this origin, not a CDN: the Site keeps working when a third party
-const PDFJS_WORKER='https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/pdf.js/3.11.174/pdf.worker.min.js';
+// does not, and the CSP can name only 'self' for scripts and workers. Provenance
+// and hashes are recorded in local/static/vendor/README.md.
+const PDFJS_URL='/vendor/pdf.min.js';
+const PDFJS_WORKER=new URL('/vendor/pdf.worker.min.js', location.origin).href;
 let pdfLibP=null, temWorker=null;
 // Alguns navegadores e iframes bloqueiam Worker de blob. Descobrimos antes de
 // tentar, porque sem worker o PDF é lido na thread principal e precisa de outra

local/nginx.conf.template

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ server {
     add_header Referrer-Policy no-referrer always;
     add_header X-Frame-Options DENY always;
     add_header Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()" always;
-    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' @SCRIPT_HASHES@ https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://cdn.vnda.com.br; connect-src 'self' ${S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT} https://cdn.vnda.com.br https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; worker-src 'self' blob: https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'" always;
+    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' @SCRIPT_HASHES@; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://cdn.vnda.com.br; connect-src 'self' ${S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT} https://cdn.vnda.com.br; worker-src 'self' blob:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'" always;
     location = /health { access_log off; return 200 'ok'; }
     location /api/ {
         limit_req zone=api_limit burst=100 nodelay;

local/secrets.py

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 """Resolve Docker secret files into the environment before configuration is read.
 
 Swarm mounts each secret as a file and the stack passes its path as `<NAME>_FILE`.
-Nothing read `_FILE` settings, so `deploy/stack.yaml` could not boot: the runtime
+The deployed `docker-compose.yml` passes credentials as plain environment
-looked for `DATABASE_URL`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` and `OPERATOR_PASSWORD` while the
+variables, so this module is inert there. It exists so a stack can supply them as
-stack supplied only the `_FILE` form.
+Docker secrets instead without any code change; see `ROADMAP.md` 2.12.
 
 Call `load()` in every entrypoint before any configuration is read.
 
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ secrets` elsewhere in the package to the standard library, not to this file.
 """
 import os
 
-# The settings production supplies as secret files. Any other `*_FILE` variable is
+# The settings a stack may supply as secret files. Any other `*_FILE` variable is
 # resolved the same way; this list documents the contract and is what the release
-# gate checks against, so keep it in step with `deploy/stack.yaml`.
+# gate checks against.
 SECRET_FILE_SETTINGS = (
     'DATABASE_URL',
     'DATABASE_ADMIN_URL',

local/static/vendor/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Vendored third-party assets
+
+Served from this repository rather than a CDN, so the Site does not depend on a
+third party being reachable and honest at the moment a customer opens it, and so
+the Content-Security-Policy can name only `'self'` for scripts and workers.
+
+## pdf.js 3.11.174
+
+Used by the by-metre flow to measure and rasterise a PDF sheet in the browser.
+
+| File | SHA-256 |
+|---|---|
+| `pdf.min.js` | `5b5799e6f8c680663207ac5b42ee14eed2a406fa7af48f50c154f0c0b1566946` |
+| `pdf.worker.min.js` | `feabdf309770ed24bba31a5467836cdc8cf639c705af27d52b585b041bb8527b` |
+
+Downloaded from `https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/pdf.js/3.11.174/` and
+verified against the SRI digests cdnjs publishes for that release:
+
+```
+pdf.min.js         sha512-q+4liFwdPC/bNdhUpZx6aXDx/h77yEQtn4I1slHydcbZK34nLaR3cAeYSJshoxIOq3mjEf7xJE8YWIUHMn+oCQ==
+pdf.worker.min.js  sha512-BbrZ76UNZq5BhH7LL7pn9A4TKQpQeNCHOo65/akfelcIBbcVvYWOFQKPXIrykE3qZxYjmDX573oa4Ywsc7rpTw==
+```
+
+To verify or refresh, compare against that API before replacing anything:
+
+```bash
+curl -s "https://api.cdnjs.com/libraries/pdf.js/<version>?fields=sri"
+```
+
+**Version note.** 3.11.174 is old. It is affected by GHSA-wgrm-67xf-hhpq, whose
+documented workaround is `isEvalSupported: false`; `dtf-site.html` already passes
+that, so the known path is closed. Upgrading is worthwhile but is an API change,
+not a file swap, and belongs with its own browser testing — see `ROADMAP.md` 2.7.