One OPERATOR_EMAIL and OPERATOR_PASSWORD served the whole factory, so every card
movement recorded the same name and the movement history could not answer who
did what. Traceability was one of the things the project set out to provide.
Accounts live in dtf_local.operators, authenticated with the same scrypt hashing
as customer accounts and with comparable work whether or not the account exists,
so absence is not observable by timing. Administration is a CLI in the API
container, like the schema migration: list, add, password, disable, enable.
Passwords are read from the terminal rather than an argument so they stay out of
shell history and the process list, and disabling deletes that operator's open
sessions instead of leaving them valid for the rest of the eight-hour window.
Migration is the part that could hurt: an empty table means 503 and a factory
locked out of its Kanban. OPERATOR_EMAIL and OPERATOR_PASSWORD seed the first
account, and only when that email is absent, so a password changed through the
CLI survives a redeploy carrying a stale environment variable. The first attempt
at this silently did nothing, because db-init receives its own small environment
and had neither variable; both compose files now pass them to it.
Verified against a running stack: bootstrap seeds the existing credential, that
credential still logs in unchanged, a second operator authenticates separately,
wrong passwords and unknown accounts are rejected alike, and disabling revokes
an open session immediately.
Roles are left out on purpose. The separation of duties the meeting described
governs rework authorisation, which this system does not implement, so a role
model would have no consumer to serve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
deploy/stack.yaml passes DATABASE_URL_FILE, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID_FILE,
OPERATOR_PASSWORD_FILE and the provider tokens as Swarm secret paths, but the
runtime only ever read the plain names. That stack could not start: the database
URL and R2 credentials were absent, and operator login raised KeyError, so it
returned 500 instead of the intended 503.
local/secrets.py resolves every <NAME>_FILE into <NAME> before configuration is
read, from the API, worker and bootstrap entrypoints. It fails closed on an
unreadable or empty secret and on a name supplied both directly and as a file,
because starting with a credential nobody intended is worse than not starting.
Only one trailing newline is stripped, so a generated password keeps any
whitespace that belongs to it, and no value reaches an error message.
The stack also passed OPERATOR_USER while the Kanban authenticates by email;
it now passes OPERATOR_EMAIL, matching the runtime.
The release gate checked this by searching local/secrets.py for the literal
"DATABASE_URL_FILE", which would pass for any file containing that string. It
now loads the module and makes it resolve every secret the stack declares, and
asserts it fails closed on a missing one. Four marker strings that stopped
matching when R2 support landed are removed rather than left to rot; the two
that still describe real blockers stay, so the gate continues to refuse a
release while payment and messaging adapters are fake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docker-compose.yml passed POSTGRES_PASSWORD as APP_DB_PASSWORD, so the DML-only
dtf_app role and the owning administrator shared one credential and the
privilege separation bootstrap.py sets up was decorative.
APP_DB_PASSWORD is now its own required variable, and bootstrap refuses to run
when it matches the administrator password, in both the URL and discrete-field
configuration forms.
Deploying this requires APP_DB_PASSWORD to be set in the stack environment
first; db-init rotates the role to it on the same deploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
