dtf-site.html held commercial rules, the nesting engine, PDF analysis, the cart
and every handler in a single inline script, 42% of the runtime code in one
file, and the money logic lived in the middle of it.
It is now nine files under local/static, cut at the section markers the original
author left, so no function was split across a boundary: config, product modes,
upload, sheet analysis, PDF, quality, packing, cart, flow. They load as classic
scripts in the original order and share one global scope, so evaluation is
exactly what it was; the extraction was checked byte-identical against the
original before the tags replaced it. dtf-site.html is 1,394 lines of markup and
style.
With no inline script left anywhere, the policy no longer needs a hash
allowlist: script-src is now 'self' alone, which is stronger than what it
replaced and cannot drift as the page changes.
Three things depended on the old shape and were updated rather than worked
around. The pricing parity test read the ladder out of the HTML and now reads it
from site-config.js, still proving the server agrees with what the customer is
shown. The isolated artwork test served four hardcoded script paths and now
serves any script that resolves inside local/static, so the next file added does
not silently 404. The CSP assertion checked the whole policy for 'unsafe-inline'
and now checks the script-src directive alone, since style-src legitimately
carries it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The suites connected to localhost:<published port>, which works for a developer
but not on a containerised runner: published ports live in the host's network
namespace, so the runner container gets connection refused.
Run them from inside the stack instead, against the gateway by service name.
SITE_BASE_URL and SITE_HOST_HEADER make that possible without weakening what is
under test: the Host stays "localhost", so the gateway's host check and
TrustedHostMiddleware see exactly what a localhost run produces, and the tests
that deliberately send their own Host still override it.
S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT has to agree, because presigned URLs are signed against it
and the signature covers the host, so it cannot be rewritten afterwards. CI
points the whole stack at http://storage:9000 so the URLs it hands out are
reachable by whoever follows them.
The browser suites still need Chrome to reach the stack from the runner, which
the same namespace split prevents. They now check reachability and skip with a
warning instead of failing with a bare connection error; recorded as ROADMAP
5.10, since they are the only coverage for the artwork editor.
Verified both ways: the six suites pass inside the network, and an unchanged
developer localhost run still passes, as do both browser suites locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
uvicorn does not trust forwarded headers from a peer outside
forwarded_allow_ips, so request.client.host was the web gateway for every
request. The auth-source bucket therefore counted all customers together:
60 failed logins from one attacker locked out everyone. Security events
recorded the gateway address, which made the audit trail useless for
attribution.
The gateway now overwrites X-Forwarded-For with the peer address it observed
instead of appending to whatever the client sent, so the header carries one
value the client cannot choose, and client_ip() resolves it with a fallback to
the connection peer.
The guest-session limiter was keyed on the environment name, making it one
global bucket of 120 per 15 minutes: roughly eight new visitors a minute for
the whole site before legitimate traffic started receiving 429. It is now per
source, and the ceiling is deliberately generous because offices and mobile
carriers put many real customers behind a single address.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
