Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Cauê Faleiros
da903db32a feat: serve pdf.js from this origin instead of a CDN
All checks were successful
Build and deploy / Validate source (push) Successful in 5s
Build and deploy / Integration suite on a real stack (push) Successful in 1m10s
Build and deploy / Secret scan and release gate (push) Successful in 5s
Build and deploy / Publish images and notify Portainer (push) Successful in 1m43s
The Site pulled pdf.js 3.11.174 from cdnjs with no integrity attribute, and the
policy trusted the whole of cdnjs.cloudflare.com for both script-src and
worker-src. Anything that host served would have executed, and a customer
measuring a PDF sheet depended on it being reachable.

Vendor both files instead of pinning a hash: it removes the dependency rather
than constraining it, and lets the policy name only 'self'. Provenance and
SHA-256 digests are recorded in local/static/vendor/README.md, verified on
download against the SRI digests cdnjs publishes for that release.

cdnjs is now absent from script-src, worker-src and connect-src in both gateway
templates. Workers are 'self' plus blob:, which the Site needs for the worker it
constructs itself.

Verified in a browser against the running stack: pdf.js loads from /vendor/, the
blob worker starts, and a real seven-page PDF parses with no CSP violation. Both
browser suites and the full integration suite pass.

The version is deliberately unchanged. 3.11.174 is old, but its known eval path
is already closed by isEvalSupported:false, and upgrading is an API change that
needs its own testing rather than riding along with this.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 13:56:02 -03:00
Cauê Faleiros
52ae13c9a1 fix: rate-limit and audit by real client address
uvicorn does not trust forwarded headers from a peer outside
forwarded_allow_ips, so request.client.host was the web gateway for every
request. The auth-source bucket therefore counted all customers together:
60 failed logins from one attacker locked out everyone. Security events
recorded the gateway address, which made the audit trail useless for
attribution.

The gateway now overwrites X-Forwarded-For with the peer address it observed
instead of appending to whatever the client sent, so the header carries one
value the client cannot choose, and client_ip() resolves it with a fallback to
the connection peer.

The guest-session limiter was keyed on the environment name, making it one
global bucket of 120 per 15 minutes: roughly eight new visitors a minute for
the whole site before legitimate traffic started receiving 429. It is now per
source, and the ceiling is deliberately generous because offices and mobile
carriers put many real customers behind a single address.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 18:48:31 -03:00
Cauê Faleiros
98c951d374 first commit
Some checks failed
Validate, publish and deploy / validate (push) Successful in 2m2s
Validate, publish and deploy / publish-and-deploy (push) Failing after 8s
2026-09-15 16:42:34 -03:00