The payment page lists credit card (preselected), debit card and PIX. Each
card option limits Mercado Pago's form to its kind; debit is paid at once.
Card payments ask for 3-D Secure when the issuer requires it, and a
challenge opens the bank's page in a frame, which needs
PAYMENT_CHALLENGE_SOURCES=https: (frames and form posts only). A card left
waiting for that confirmation stops blocking a new attempt after ten
minutes, and a refusal reported by the notification returns the customer to
the payment choice. Written from the documentation; not yet run with a real
debit card.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The payment page puts paying on the left and the order summary on the
right (above it on phones). Card is preselected and paid on the page with
Mercado Pago's form, in the Site's colours and with the order's e-mail;
choosing PIX shows a Pagar button that opens /pagamento/pix with the QR code
and copy-and-paste code, waiting there for the confirmation. A confirmed
payment shows "Pagamento confirmado" with the order number and a button to
the customer's orders. The payment buttons no longer restyle every button
inside the form.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The PIX and card choices appeared under the cart, on the same page as the
customer's details. "Ir para o pagamento" now sends the order and opens
/pagamento, step 3 of the progress bar: the server's order summary, then PIX
or card, each opening below. The cart keeps only the sending progress and its
errors; a changed cart is sent again instead of offering the old quote.
Portal links open the payment page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The proxy in front of production caches .js and .css for hours. After the
last release the Site got the new index.html with the old site-flow.js,
which wrote to an element the new page no longer has; the error left
"Adicionar ao carrinho" disabled. The web build now addresses every local
script and stylesheet by a hash of its content, replacing the hand-kept
?v= markers, so a new release always loads its own files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The production compose hard-coded the fake payment adapter; it now takes
PAYMENT_ADAPTER and the MP_* settings from the stack's environment, so the
sandbox can run with test credentials. A signed notification about a payment
Mercado Pago does not have, such as the panel's "Simular notificação", is
acknowledged instead of answering 500 and being retried; any other lookup
failure still raises.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The client already sends WhatsApp notices from Tiny's order situação
(Tiny webhook -> middleware -> n8n). With TINY_STATUS_UPDATES on, a paid
order is set to "Aprovada" once and a finished pickup order to "Pronto
para envio"; pickup orders carry the client's pickup forma de envio
(TINY_FORMA_ENVIO_RETIRADA). The ready event now carries the order and
the Tiny id from the sale's receipt. Off by default until go-live, when
n8n stops sending the DTFIMP designer message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The home, each product's Montagem and the cart now have their own
addresses (/artes-avulsas, /arquivo-por-metro, /uv-artes-avulsas,
/uv-arquivo-por-metro, /carrinho) and show only their own content, with
Back, Forward, reload and direct links working as in any store. They stay
one document so uploaded artworks survive moving between pages; nginx
serves index.html for these addresses.
"Adicionar ao carrinho" puts the item in the cart and opens it, and an
empty cart says so. Portal quote links open in the cart. Also fixes the
"57 cm" line break on the ready-sheet option, returns "Novo pedido" to
the home, and says PDF depends on the product.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The release job enforced the production source preflight, which blocks while
the payment and messaging adapters are fake. They still are, by design, so
since 2026-09-23 no release could succeed and production kept running older
images while main moved on.
Pushes to main that pass validation, the integration suite and the scans now
build, scan and publish the images. Nothing is deployed automatically:
production changes when the stack is pulled and redeployed in Portainer. A
manual run also calls the Portainer webhook when one is configured. The
preflight stays in the scan job, advisory unless ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT
is true, in which case a blocked preflight stops publishing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PDF artwork: a single-page PDF source is placed in the print file as a
vector form through pikepdf, never rasterised, using the CropBox and
inherited /Rotate the Site measured with pdf.js. Multi-page and protected
PDFs go to hand preparation. PyMuPDF was not used because of its AGPL
licence. Raster tests cover crop, page rotation, placement rotation and
mirroring, and fail when the rotation or crop handling is broken.
Card payment: Mercado Pago's Card Payment Brick on the Site when
MP_PUBLIC_KEY is set; the card becomes a one-time token in Mercado Pago's
secure fields. Each card attempt has its own idempotency key, and the intent
route refuses new attempts once a payment is approved or a card is in
review, so a quote cannot be charged twice. The Site CSP admits Mercado
Pago's origins only through PAYMENT_CSP_SOURCES, empty by default.
Logins: every attempt counts against the source address, only failures
against the account. Counting successful sign-ins let ordinary use lock an
operator out and made CI's final browser sign-in fail.
No new required settings; production behaviour is unchanged until the
provider credentials are configured. Verified with the full CI integration
sequence locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tiny v3 replaces the v2 token adapter. An operator connects Tiny once from
the Kanban; the callback is authorised by a single-use state, because Tiny's
cross-site redirect does not carry the SameSite=Strict operator cookie.
Tokens are kept in provider_tokens, the refresh token rotates under a row
lock, and the worker keeps the connection alive while order creation is off.
Orders find or create the customer's contact by CNPJ, then POST /pedidos
with product ids from TINY_PRODUCT_TEXTIL_FOLHA, _TEXTIL_AVULSA, _UV_FOLHA
and _UV_AVULSA and numeroOrdemCompra DTF-<number>; a retry searches the
customer's recent orders for that number first. The product settings avoid a
_FILE suffix, which the secrets loader reads as a secret file path.
Production passes the application credentials through but keeps
TINY_ADAPTER fake: Tiny has no sandbox, so creating real orders waits for a
supervised test. compose.providers.yaml gives the local API and worker an
internet route for provider testing; the default local stack still has none.
Verified with the full CI integration sequence locally, including the new
tiny_oauth_test against the real database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Thirteen files at the repository root, seven of them documents. Only README.md
earns a place there; the rest are now in docs/ beside the meeting notes, the
client roadmap and the historical material.
The compose files stay. docker-compose.yml is the path the dtf-cloud Portainer
stack reads, so moving it would break deployment, and Docker resolves a compose
file's relative build contexts against its own directory, so moving the other
two would silently break every build. Both reasons are now written down where
someone would otherwise try it.
Correcting references turned up a live fault: the Portainer stack creation
instructions still named deploy/stack.yaml as the compose path. That file was
removed, so anyone recreating the stack from these instructions would have
failed. It names docker-compose.yml now, with the reason it stays at the root.
ROADMAP.md keeps the paths its closed findings were written with, and says so at
the top. Those entries record where a fault was when it was found; rewriting
them to match a later layout would make the record less true, not more.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
local/ held six unrelated things under a name that stopped being true once it
became the production runtime: the service, the frontend, the tests, the ops
commands, the container definitions and the dependency lock, 65 files with
nothing to tell them apart.
app/ the service: api/ routers, core/ for identity, database, models,
prices and secret loading, and the worker, bootstrap and schema
tests/ the twelve suites, no longer inside the shipped package
ops/ backup, readiness, dependency audit, security summary
infra/ Dockerfiles, gateway templates, ClamAV and storage configuration,
the requirements and their hash lock
web/ the Site, Kanban and portal pages with their scripts
deploy/Dockerfile.api now copies app/ alone, so the tests stop shipping to
production; the local image still carries them, because the suites run inside
the stack's network.
Five kinds of reference had to follow, and each was found by something different
rather than by reading. Imports of the form "from . import db" survived a rewrite
that only matched "from .db import". Tests kept relative imports of modules that
had left the package. A mock.patch target names its module in a string, where no
import rewriting can see it. The browser test resolves a fixture by path. And the
release gate's markers pointed at local/runtime.py and local/worker.py, which is
the decay its new marker test exists to catch — it caught it.
Verified from docker compose down -v: the stack starts, all six integration
suites, both browser suites and the twenty-nine unit tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Site's page sat at the repository root while its scripts lived in
local/static, a split with no reason behind it. They are together in web/ now,
with the page as index.html, which is also what the image serves.
app.py held the adapters, the configuration, the shared query helpers and
nineteen routes; customer.py held fourteen more but could not import from it
without a cycle, so it was wired by passing nine callables into install_routes.
Configuration and shared helpers move to local/runtime.py, the rules for
attaching artwork to an order move to local/artwork.py where a customer
correction and an operator final-file set can share them, and the routes become
seven routers under local/api. app.py is 48 lines that create the application,
apply the middleware and include them. Routers import downwards only.
Three faults came out of the extraction and are worth recording, because each
passed a check that looked sufficient. ast reports a function's line at the def,
so every decorator on the line above fell outside the extracted range: twelve
routes and the security middleware were defined but never registered, and the
files still imported and parsed cleanly. Names the old closure renamed on the
way in, and a Jsonb import, were missing in three modules. A name-resolution
pass over every new module found those; the route count matching the original
exactly, 32, is what confirmed the first.
The release gate's marker for the fake payment adapter pointed at app.py and the
adapter moved to runtime.py, so the gate passed while the condition it guards was
unchanged. That is the same silent decay 2.5 set out to fix. A test now asserts
every marker still matches something in its file, so the next move fails loudly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Site pulled pdf.js 3.11.174 from cdnjs with no integrity attribute, and the
policy trusted the whole of cdnjs.cloudflare.com for both script-src and
worker-src. Anything that host served would have executed, and a customer
measuring a PDF sheet depended on it being reachable.
Vendor both files instead of pinning a hash: it removes the dependency rather
than constraining it, and lets the policy name only 'self'. Provenance and
SHA-256 digests are recorded in local/static/vendor/README.md, verified on
download against the SRI digests cdnjs publishes for that release.
cdnjs is now absent from script-src, worker-src and connect-src in both gateway
templates. Workers are 'self' plus blob:, which the Site needs for the worker it
constructs itself.
Verified in a browser against the running stack: pdf.js loads from /vendor/, the
blob worker starts, and a real seven-page PDF parses with no CSP violation. Both
browser suites and the full integration suite pass.
The version is deliberately unchanged. 3.11.174 is old, but its known eval path
is already closed by isEvalSupported:false, and upgrading is an API change that
needs its own testing rather than riding along with this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
deploy/stack.yaml arrived in the first commit and was never deployed. Portainer
runs the repository's docker-compose.yml. Keeping both meant two definitions
drifting apart, with the documentation naming the one nobody used, which is how
the credential question came up at all.
The hardening it offered is narrower than it looks: Docker secrets keep values
out of docker inspect and the Portainer console, but local/secrets.py loads them
into the process environment regardless, and anyone able to read docker inspect
can already read the secret files. With a single Portainer user, the benefit that
remains does not outweigh maintaining a divergent copy.
local/secrets.py stays: inert against the deployed file, and it lets a stack
switch to Docker secrets later without touching code. The preflight and its tests
degrade cleanly when no such stack is present.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The production gateway does not face the internet: nginx-proxy-manager owns
80/443 on the host and proxies to it. So $remote_addr inside the gateway is that
proxy, and overwriting X-Forwarded-For with it discarded the customer address
the proxy had already recorded. Every request would have been attributed to one
internal address, which is exactly the fault 2.1 set out to fix, reintroduced in
production only.
Use real_ip to take the customer address from the proxy's header, trusting only
private networks. A request that reaches the published port directly from the
internet is not trusted, so its header is ignored and $remote_addr stays the
real peer: the anti-spoofing property is kept.
Also downgrade 2.9. TLS is not missing, it is terminated by that proxy. The gap
is that the repository never says so, which would break every session cookie if
the stack moved to a host without one.
Validated with nginx -t against the rendered production configuration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The production images built on mutable tags with --pull, so the same commit
could produce different bases, and neither Dockerfile upgraded its OS packages
even though the local ones did. The published API image carried 56 HIGH and 3
CRITICAL findings, 15 of them with an upstream fix available.
Pin both bases by digest and upgrade OS packages in the production images. That
removes all 3 CRITICAL and 13 of the 15 fixable findings. The remaining two,
msgpack and setuptools, come from a third-party SBOM; neither package is
importable or listed by pip in the built image, which I confirmed rather than
taking the previous report's word for it.
The web image could not be fixed this way: the official 1.28 line pins
nginx=1.28.3-r1 in /etc/apk/world, so apk upgrade leaves five HIGH findings in
place even though Alpine ships 1.28.3-r7. Moving to nginx:alpine (1.31.6)
clears them completely; 1.29-alpine scans worse, at 37 HIGH. Same uid 101 and
the same template entrypoint, and the local images now use the same pinned
bases so the integration suite exercises what ships. Full suite passes on
nginx 1.31.6, including the browser end-to-end.
With both images at zero CRITICAL, the image scan now blocks on CRITICAL and
reports HIGH, instead of reporting everything. PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE and
NGINX_BASE_IMAGE are wired through to the builds so a base can move forward
without editing the repository, which is what PORTAINER.md already promised.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
deploy/stack.yaml passes DATABASE_URL_FILE, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID_FILE,
OPERATOR_PASSWORD_FILE and the provider tokens as Swarm secret paths, but the
runtime only ever read the plain names. That stack could not start: the database
URL and R2 credentials were absent, and operator login raised KeyError, so it
returned 500 instead of the intended 503.
local/secrets.py resolves every <NAME>_FILE into <NAME> before configuration is
read, from the API, worker and bootstrap entrypoints. It fails closed on an
unreadable or empty secret and on a name supplied both directly and as a file,
because starting with a credential nobody intended is worse than not starting.
Only one trailing newline is stripped, so a generated password keeps any
whitespace that belongs to it, and no value reaches an error message.
The stack also passed OPERATOR_USER while the Kanban authenticates by email;
it now passes OPERATOR_EMAIL, matching the runtime.
The release gate checked this by searching local/secrets.py for the literal
"DATABASE_URL_FILE", which would pass for any file containing that string. It
now loads the module and makes it resolve every secret the stack declares, and
asserts it fails closed on a missing one. Four marker strings that stopped
matching when R2 support landed are removed rather than left to rot; the two
that still describe real blockers stay, so the gate continues to refuse a
release while payment and messaging adapters are fake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
uvicorn does not trust forwarded headers from a peer outside
forwarded_allow_ips, so request.client.host was the web gateway for every
request. The auth-source bucket therefore counted all customers together:
60 failed logins from one attacker locked out everyone. Security events
recorded the gateway address, which made the audit trail useless for
attribution.
The gateway now overwrites X-Forwarded-For with the peer address it observed
instead of appending to whatever the client sent, so the header carries one
value the client cannot choose, and client_ip() resolves it with a fallback to
the connection peer.
The guest-session limiter was keyed on the environment name, making it one
global bucket of 120 per 15 minutes: roughly eight new visitors a minute for
the whole site before legitimate traffic started receiving 429. It is now per
source, and the ceiling is deliberately generous because offices and mobile
carriers put many real customers behind a single address.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
