One OPERATOR_EMAIL and OPERATOR_PASSWORD served the whole factory, so every card
movement recorded the same name and the movement history could not answer who
did what. Traceability was one of the things the project set out to provide.
Accounts live in dtf_local.operators, authenticated with the same scrypt hashing
as customer accounts and with comparable work whether or not the account exists,
so absence is not observable by timing. Administration is a CLI in the API
container, like the schema migration: list, add, password, disable, enable.
Passwords are read from the terminal rather than an argument so they stay out of
shell history and the process list, and disabling deletes that operator's open
sessions instead of leaving them valid for the rest of the eight-hour window.
Migration is the part that could hurt: an empty table means 503 and a factory
locked out of its Kanban. OPERATOR_EMAIL and OPERATOR_PASSWORD seed the first
account, and only when that email is absent, so a password changed through the
CLI survives a redeploy carrying a stale environment variable. The first attempt
at this silently did nothing, because db-init receives its own small environment
and had neither variable; both compose files now pass them to it.
Verified against a running stack: bootstrap seeds the existing credential, that
credential still logs in unchanged, a second operator authenticates separately,
wrong passwords and unknown accounts are rejected alike, and disabling revokes
an open session immediately.
Roles are left out on purpose. The separation of duties the meeting described
governs rework authorisation, which this system does not implement, so a role
model would have no consumer to serve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
uvicorn does not trust forwarded headers from a peer outside
forwarded_allow_ips, so request.client.host was the web gateway for every
request. The auth-source bucket therefore counted all customers together:
60 failed logins from one attacker locked out everyone. Security events
recorded the gateway address, which made the audit trail useless for
attribution.
The gateway now overwrites X-Forwarded-For with the peer address it observed
instead of appending to whatever the client sent, so the header carries one
value the client cannot choose, and client_ip() resolves it with a fallback to
the connection peer.
The guest-session limiter was keyed on the environment name, making it one
global bucket of 120 per 15 minutes: roughly eight new visitors a minute for
the whole site before legitimate traffic started receiving 429. It is now per
source, and the ceiling is deliberately generous because offices and mobile
carriers put many real customers behind a single address.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
