Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Cauê Faleiros
4c01e932c3 feat: place PDF artwork in print files, add card payment, count only failed logins
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PDF artwork: a single-page PDF source is placed in the print file as a
vector form through pikepdf, never rasterised, using the CropBox and
inherited /Rotate the Site measured with pdf.js. Multi-page and protected
PDFs go to hand preparation. PyMuPDF was not used because of its AGPL
licence. Raster tests cover crop, page rotation, placement rotation and
mirroring, and fail when the rotation or crop handling is broken.

Card payment: Mercado Pago's Card Payment Brick on the Site when
MP_PUBLIC_KEY is set; the card becomes a one-time token in Mercado Pago's
secure fields. Each card attempt has its own idempotency key, and the intent
route refuses new attempts once a payment is approved or a card is in
review, so a quote cannot be charged twice. The Site CSP admits Mercado
Pago's origins only through PAYMENT_CSP_SOURCES, empty by default.

Logins: every attempt counts against the source address, only failures
against the account. Counting successful sign-ins let ordinary use lock an
operator out and made CI's final browser sign-in fail.

No new required settings; production behaviour is unchanged until the
provider credentials are configured. Verified with the full CI integration
sequence locally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 13:14:56 -03:00
Cauê Faleiros
24013458c9 fix: harden week-two ordering, artwork and operations 2026-09-23 10:40:18 -03:00
Cauê Faleiros
ccc25a2d5d feat: accept payment notifications, once, from a verified sender
There was no inbound payment path at all: a button called a fake synchronously
and wrote an order. A real provider does the opposite — it charges, then tells
us, repeatedly, out of order, and sometimes long afterwards.

POST /api/payments/webhook verifies the signature before the body is parsed, so
an unsigned or tampered delivery is refused and recorded without touching an
order. Verified deliveries are stored under the provider's own event id with a
unique constraint, and applied inside the same transaction that marks them
processed: a repeat is a no-op, a crash is retried rather than half-applied.

An approval whose amount disagrees with the reviewed quote does not become an
order. Underpayment would ship artwork nobody paid for, and overpayment means
something a person should look at.

Order creation moved to app/payments.py so the webhook and the local development
checkout share one implementation and cannot drift. That also closes 3.5: the
charge happens inside the transaction that persists the order, rather than
before it.

The adapter contract is create/verify/parse. FakePayment implements it with a
real HMAC scheme so the whole path is exercised now, by tests/payment_test.py:
unsigned, tampered, underpaid, duplicate, re-sent, unknown reference, and
non-approved statuses. Connecting Mercado Pago is one adapter; no service code
changes.

PAYMENT_WEBHOOK_SECRET is optional in production on purpose. Required would
break the next Portainer render, and a guessable default would be worse than
either: with no secret configured the adapter verifies nothing and therefore
accepts nothing, which is the right state until a provider is connected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 13:25:08 -03:00