refactor: lay the repository out by role
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local/ held six unrelated things under a name that stopped being true once it
became the production runtime: the service, the frontend, the tests, the ops
commands, the container definitions and the dependency lock, 65 files with
nothing to tell them apart.
app/ the service: api/ routers, core/ for identity, database, models,
prices and secret loading, and the worker, bootstrap and schema
tests/ the twelve suites, no longer inside the shipped package
ops/ backup, readiness, dependency audit, security summary
infra/ Dockerfiles, gateway templates, ClamAV and storage configuration,
the requirements and their hash lock
web/ the Site, Kanban and portal pages with their scripts
deploy/Dockerfile.api now copies app/ alone, so the tests stop shipping to
production; the local image still carries them, because the suites run inside
the stack's network.
Five kinds of reference had to follow, and each was found by something different
rather than by reading. Imports of the form "from . import db" survived a rewrite
that only matched "from .db import". Tests kept relative imports of modules that
had left the package. A mock.patch target names its module in a string, where no
import rewriting can see it. The browser test resolves a fixture by path. And the
release gate's markers pointed at local/runtime.py and local/worker.py, which is
the decay its new marker test exists to catch — it caught it.
Verified from docker compose down -v: the stack starts, all six integration
suites, both browser suites and the twenty-nine unit tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
81
app/scanning.py
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81
app/scanning.py
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@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
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"""Local ClamAV boundary. Unknown/error/over-limit results NEVER release artwork."""
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import os
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import socket
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import struct
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import time
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from fastapi import HTTPException
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from .core.auth import audit
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from .core.db import connect
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def require_clean(row):
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if not row['complete'] or row['scan_state'] != 'clean':
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raise HTTPException(409, 'Artwork is quarantined until the malware scan succeeds')
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class ClamAV:
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def command(self, command, timeout=2):
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with socket.create_connection(('scanner',3310),timeout=timeout) as sock:
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sock.settimeout(timeout)
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sock.sendall(b'z'+command+b'\0')
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reply=b''
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while b'\0' not in reply and len(reply)<4096:
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block=sock.recv(4096)
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if not block:break
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reply+=block
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return reply.rstrip(b'\0\n')
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def ping(self):
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return self.command(b'PING') == b'PONG'
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def version(self):
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return self.command(b'VERSION').decode('utf-8','replace')
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def scan(self, stream, size):
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if size > min(134217728, int(os.environ.get('SCAN_MAX_BYTES','134217728'))):
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return 'rejected', 'File exceeds the malware scan limit'
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with socket.create_connection(('scanner',3310),timeout=10) as sock:
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sock.settimeout(150)
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sock.sendall(b'zINSTREAM\0')
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sent=0
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for chunk in stream.iter_chunks(chunk_size=65536):
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sent+=len(chunk)
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if sent>size: return 'rejected','Stored file size changed'
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sock.sendall(struct.pack('!I',len(chunk))+chunk)
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if sent!=size:return 'rejected','Stored file size changed'
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sock.sendall(b'\0\0\0\0')
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reply=b''
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while b'\0' not in reply and len(reply)<4096:
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block=sock.recv(4096)
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if not block:break
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reply+=block
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result=reply.rstrip(b'\0\n')
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if result==b'stream: OK':return 'clean',None
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if result.endswith(b' FOUND'):return 'rejected','Malware or unsafe scan condition detected'
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return 'error','Scanner could not verify this file'
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def scan_one(storage, scanner=None):
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scanner=scanner or ClamAV()
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with connect() as c:
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row=c.execute('''SELECT * FROM dtf_local.uploads WHERE complete AND purged_at IS NULL
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AND expires_at>now() AND scan_state IN ('pending','error') AND scan_after<=now()
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ORDER BY created_at FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED LIMIT 1''').fetchone()
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if not row:return False
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try:
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stream=storage.client.get_object(Bucket=storage.bucket,Key=row['object_key'])['Body']
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try:state,reason=scanner.scan(stream,row['size'])
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finally:stream.close()
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except Exception:
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state,reason='error','Malware scanner unavailable; file remains blocked'
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c.execute("""UPDATE dtf_local.uploads SET scan_state=%s,scan_reason=%s,scanned_at=now(),
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scan_after=now()+interval '1 minute',
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expires_at=CASE WHEN %s IN ('rejected','error') THEN LEAST(expires_at,now()+interval '3 days') ELSE expires_at END
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WHERE id=%s""",(state,reason,state,row['id']))
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audit('artwork_scan', upload=str(row['id']), result=state)
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return True
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def scan_loop(storage):
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while True:
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try:
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if scan_one(storage):continue
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except Exception:
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audit('scanner_worker_error')
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time.sleep(1)
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