refactor: lay the repository out by role

local/ held six unrelated things under a name that stopped being true once it
became the production runtime: the service, the frontend, the tests, the ops
commands, the container definitions and the dependency lock, 65 files with
nothing to tell them apart.

  app/      the service: api/ routers, core/ for identity, database, models,
            prices and secret loading, and the worker, bootstrap and schema
  tests/    the twelve suites, no longer inside the shipped package
  ops/      backup, readiness, dependency audit, security summary
  infra/    Dockerfiles, gateway templates, ClamAV and storage configuration,
            the requirements and their hash lock
  web/      the Site, Kanban and portal pages with their scripts

deploy/Dockerfile.api now copies app/ alone, so the tests stop shipping to
production; the local image still carries them, because the suites run inside
the stack's network.

Five kinds of reference had to follow, and each was found by something different
rather than by reading. Imports of the form "from . import db" survived a rewrite
that only matched "from .db import". Tests kept relative imports of modules that
had left the package. A mock.patch target names its module in a string, where no
import rewriting can see it. The browser test resolves a fixture by path. And the
release gate's markers pointed at local/runtime.py and local/worker.py, which is
the decay its new marker test exists to catch — it caught it.

Verified from docker compose down -v: the stack starts, all six integration
suites, both browser suites and the twenty-nine unit tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

SECURITY_REPORT.md

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ not simply increasing the upload limit.
 Run:
 
 ```bash
-docker compose exec -T api python -m local.security_status
+docker compose exec -T api python3 -m app.security_status
 ```
 
 An exit status of 1 requires review. At closeout, attention was expected because
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ errors, unexplained authentication bursts, or stale signatures as incidents.
 
 `pip-audit` inspected the exact packages installed in the hash-enforced rebuilt API
 and found no known Python advisories on 2026-09-15. All 26 direct and transitive
-runtime packages are pinned with artifact hashes in `local/requirements.lock`.
+runtime packages are pinned with artifact hashes in `infra/requirements.lock`.
 `local/lock_dependencies.sh` regenerates it in a disposable Python 3.12 container.
 This is a point-in-time package-database result, not proof that the dependencies
 or image are vulnerability-free. Scheduled lock refresh and audit automation remain