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dtf-system/.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml
Cauê Faleiros 5f2be7ea20
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Build and deploy / Validate source (push) Successful in 12s
Build and deploy / Integration suite on a real stack (push) Failing after 2m36s
Build and deploy / Secret scan and release gate (push) Successful in 7s
Build and deploy / Publish images (push) Has been skipped
feat: accept sheets of up to 5 GB end to end
Sheets of several GB are the normal order. The upload limit is now 5 GB.
ClamAV scans files up to 2 GB; a larger file is released only when its
first bytes match the format its name claims, and a disguised file is
refused. The Site grades a sheet over 150 MB from the pixel size in its
PNG, JPEG or WebP header without decoding it, and reads large PDFs in
ranges. The worker never opens a source over 300 MB: a finished sheet
placed whole becomes its own print file, which the Kanban offers to approve
as the final, and anything else goes to hand preparation. Files start
uploading as they enter the cart, with progress in the summary, and each
part renews the reservation so slow uploads do not expire. Quotas grow to
50 GB per customer and 500 GB in total; the Swarm config for ClamAV is
renamed because a deployed config cannot change in place.

Verified locally with a 386 MB and a 1.8 GB PNG (scanned, paid, original
as print file), a 2.3 GB PNG (format check) and a disguised 2.3 GB file
(refused).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 13:18:18 -03:00

269 lines
12 KiB
YAML

name: Build and deploy
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches: [main]
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
validate:
name: Validate source
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- name: Run fast regression checks
run: |
python3 -m py_compile app/*.py app/**/*.py ops/*.py deploy/*.py
python3 -m unittest \
tests.test_dependency_lock \
tests.test_staging_readiness \
deploy.test_production_preflight \
tests.test_pricing \
tests.test_secrets -v
sh -n infra/lock_dependencies.sh
integration:
name: Integration suite on a real stack
needs: validate
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 45
env:
# The runner shares the host's Docker daemon, so every published port is
# taken on the machine itself. Known occupants of that host:
# 8000, 9443 Portainer (the Edge tunnel and its UI)
# 18080/18081 the production dtf-cloud stack (docker-compose.yml defaults)
# 9000/9001 MinIO defaults elsewhere
# This block avoids all of them. Ephemeral ports are not an option: the
# published port is baked into PUBLIC_ORIGIN, ALLOWED_ORIGINS and the CSP
# when the containers start, so it has to be known beforehand.
SITE_PORT: "28080"
KANBAN_PORT: "28081"
API_PORT: "28000"
STORAGE_PORT: "29000"
STORAGE_CONSOLE_PORT: "29001"
# Presigned URLs are signed against this endpoint, so it must be reachable
# by whoever follows them. The suites run inside the network, so it has to
# be the service name, not a published port on the host.
S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT: http://storage:9000
PUBLIC_ORIGIN: http://site
ALLOWED_HOSTS: localhost,127.0.0.1,site,kanban
ALLOWED_ORIGINS: http://site,http://kanban,http://localhost:28080,http://localhost:28081
COMPOSE: docker compose -f compose.local.yaml
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
# py_compile cannot see an unresolved name, and the four unit tests above
# never start the application. A missing import in local/auth.py therefore
# reached production and returned 500 on every session, login and
# registration. These suites exercise the running stack and would have
# failed on it immediately.
- name: Start the stack
run: |
$COMPOSE up --build -d --wait --wait-timeout 600
$COMPOSE ps
# Run inside the stack's own network. The runner is itself a container, so
# ports published on the host's loopback are in a different namespace and
# unreachable from here. SITE_HOST_HEADER keeps the Host the gateway and
# TrustedHostMiddleware expect, so the configuration under test is the same
# one a developer exercises on localhost.
- name: API and workflow regressions
run: |
for suite in smoke_test workflow_test security_test scanning_test payment_test quote_pagination_test print_file_test; do
echo "--- $suite"
$COMPOSE exec -T \
-e SITE_BASE_URL=http://site \
-e SITE_HOST_HEADER=localhost \
api python -m "tests.$suite"
done
# Need Pillow and httpx, which only the application image has. The raster
# check needs PyMuPDF as well and skips here; run it locally when changing
# the generator's geometry. The provider suites use a fake transport: they
# prove the documented contract, not the integration.
- name: Print-file geometry and provider adapters
run: $COMPOSE exec -T api python -m unittest tests.test_printfile tests.test_mercadopago tests.test_tiny tests.test_jadlog tests.test_quote_review tests.test_large_files -v
- name: Runtime and retention regressions
run: |
$COMPOSE exec -T api python -m tests.retention_test
$COMPOSE exec -T api python -m tests.runtime_security_test
$COMPOSE exec -T api python -m tests.tiny_oauth_test
# Run Chrome on the Compose network. It must resolve the same storage:9000
# hostname used in presigned URLs, and absence of Chrome must fail CI.
- name: Browser regressions
run: |
$COMPOSE build browser-tests
$COMPOSE run --rm --no-deps browser-tests sh -ec \
'node tests/artwork_browser_test.mjs && node tests/browser_test.mjs'
- name: Diagnostics on failure
if: failure()
run: |
$COMPOSE ps || true
$COMPOSE logs --tail 200 api worker site kanban || true
- name: Tear down
if: always()
run: $COMPOSE down -v || true
scan:
name: Secret scan and release gate
needs: validate
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
env:
TRIVY_IMAGE: ${{ vars.TRIVY_IMAGE }}
ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT: ${{ vars.ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT }}
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
# Blocking. A credential committed by accident must never reach the
# registry or the deployed stack, and the repository is clean today, so
# this gate costs nothing until it is actually needed.
- name: Secret scan
run: |
image="${TRIVY_IMAGE:-aquasec/trivy:0.58.1}"
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/src:ro" "$image" \
fs --scanners secret --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL \
--no-progress /src
# Advisory while the provider adapters are fake. This is the only copy of
# the gate: set ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT=true and a blocked preflight
# fails this job, which stops images from being published.
- name: Production source preflight
run: |
set +e
python3 deploy/production_preflight.py --source-only
verdict=$?
set -e
if [ "$verdict" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "Source preflight passes."
exit 0
fi
if [ "${ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT:-false}" = "true" ]; then
echo "::error::Source preflight blocked the release."
exit "$verdict"
fi
echo "::warning::Source preflight reports blockers (advisory; set ENFORCE_PRODUCTION_PREFLIGHT=true to gate)."
# Every push to main that passes validation, the integration suite and the
# scans publishes images. Production changes only when someone pulls and
# redeploys the stack in Portainer; a manual run of this workflow also calls
# the Portainer webhook when one is configured.
publish-and-deploy:
name: Publish images
needs: [validate, integration, scan]
if: gitea.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && (gitea.event_name == 'push' || gitea.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 45
env:
TRIVY_IMAGE: ${{ vars.TRIVY_IMAGE }}
PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE: ${{ vars.PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE }}
NGINX_BASE_IMAGE: ${{ vars.NGINX_BASE_IMAGE }}
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- name: Sign in to the Gitea Container Registry
env:
REGISTRY_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
run: |
test -n "$REGISTRY_USERNAME"
test -n "$REGISTRY_TOKEN"
echo "$REGISTRY_TOKEN" | docker login gitea.blyzer.com.br \
--username "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
- name: Build API
run: |
image="gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-api"
# The Dockerfiles pin digests themselves; these variables let a base be
# moved forward without editing the repository. --pull is intentionally
# absent: a digest already names one immutable image.
set --
[ -n "$PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE" ] && set -- --build-arg PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE="$PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE"
docker build --file deploy/Dockerfile.api "$@" \
--build-arg VCS_REF="${{ gitea.sha }}" \
--tag "$image:latest" --tag "$image:${{ gitea.sha }}" .
- name: Build web
run: |
image="gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-web"
set --
[ -n "$PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE" ] && set -- --build-arg PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE="$PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE"
[ -n "$NGINX_BASE_IMAGE" ] && set -- "$@" --build-arg NGINX_BASE_IMAGE="$NGINX_BASE_IMAGE"
docker build --file deploy/Dockerfile.web "$@" \
--build-arg VCS_REF="${{ gitea.sha }}" \
--tag "$image:latest" --tag "$image:${{ gitea.sha }}" .
# CRITICAL blocks, HIGH is reported. Both images carry zero CRITICAL after
# the base pinning and OS upgrades, so this gate holds the line already
# reached. The remaining HIGH findings have no upstream fix, so failing on
# them would stop releases without making anything safer.
- name: Image vulnerabilities
run: |
image="${TRIVY_IMAGE:-aquasec/trivy:0.58.1}"
# One database download for the four scans, kept in a volume between
# runs and retried: a failed download from the mirror used to fail
# the gate as if a CRITICAL vulnerability had been found.
trivy() { docker run --rm -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
-v dtf-trivy-cache:/root/.cache/trivy "$image" "$@"; }
for attempt in 1 2 3; do
trivy image --download-db-only --no-progress && break
if [ "$attempt" -eq 3 ]; then
echo "::error::The vulnerability database could not be downloaded; the release images were not scanned."
exit 1
fi
echo "Database download failed (attempt $attempt); retrying in 30 s."
sleep 30
done
# Findings exit 5; any other failure means the scan did not run.
found=0; broken=0
for target in \
"gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-api:${{ gitea.sha }}" \
"gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/dtf-web:${{ gitea.sha }}"; do
echo "--- $target (HIGH, reported)"
trivy image --skip-db-update --image-src docker --scanners vuln --severity HIGH --no-progress \
--format table --exit-code 0 "$target" ||
echo "::warning::Could not scan $target for HIGH findings"
echo "--- $target (CRITICAL, blocking)"
set +e
trivy image --skip-db-update --image-src docker --scanners vuln --severity CRITICAL --no-progress \
--format table --exit-code 5 "$target"
verdict=$?
set -e
if [ "$verdict" -eq 5 ]; then found=1
elif [ "$verdict" -ne 0 ]; then broken=1; echo "::error::The CRITICAL scan of $target did not run (exit $verdict)."
fi
done
if [ "$found" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "::error::A CRITICAL vulnerability was found in a release image."
exit 1
fi
if [ "$broken" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "::error::A release image could not be scanned; nothing is published unscanned."
exit 1
fi
- name: Publish validated images
run: |
for name in dtf-api dtf-web; do
image="gitea.blyzer.com.br/blyzer/$name"
docker push "$image:${{ gitea.sha }}"
docker push "$image:latest"
done
- name: Trigger Portainer redeployment
if: gitea.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
env:
PORTAINER_WEBHOOK: ${{ secrets.PORTAINER_WEBHOOK }}
run: |
if [ -z "$PORTAINER_WEBHOOK" ]; then
echo "No PORTAINER_WEBHOOK configured; redeploy the stack in Portainer."
exit 0
fi
curl --fail --silent --show-error --max-time 30 --request POST "$PORTAINER_WEBHOOK"